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Preface
The Centre for Monetary Economics (CME) at the Norwegian School of Management
BI has for the third time invited a committee of economists for Norges Bank Watch,
with the objective to evaluate the monetary-policy regime in Norway and Norges
Bank’s conduct of monetary policy.  The new committee for Norges Bank Watch
2002 consists of Professor Lars E.O. Svensson (chair), Princeton University, Chief
Economist Kjetil Houg, Alfred Berg, Doctorate Student Haakon O.Aa. Solheim,
Norwegian School of Management BI, and Professor Erling Steigum, Norwegian
School of Management BI.
The aim of Norges Bank Watch is to contribute to the general discussion on monetary
policy and institutions among the political system, the academic community and other
interested parties.  Two years ago, Norges Bank Watch 2000 suggested that the
Bank’s actual interpretation of its stable exchange-rate mandate should be formalized
as a flexible inflation-targeting regime.  In March 2001, the government introduced a
formal inflation target regime.  As was the case in last year’s report, we do not have
the ambitions to suggest another major change of the system, but we hope to highlight
important aspects of the present regime and we recommend a number of possible im-
provements of the regime.
The committee is solely responsible for the report and the views presented there, and
the report does not necessarily represent the views of the CME or its members.
Oslo, September 19, 2002
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Executive summary
The Centre for Monetary Economics (CME) at the Norwegian School of Management
BI has for the third time invited a committee of economists for Norges Bank Watch,
with the objective to evaluate the monetary-policy regime in Norway and Norges
Bank’s conduct of monetary policy.  The committee for Norges Bank Watch 2002
consists of Professor Lars E.O. Svensson (chair), Princeton University, Chief Econo-
mist Kjetil Houg, Alfred Berg, Doctorate Student Haakon O.Aa. Solheim, Norwegian
School of Management BI, and Professor Erling Steigum, Norwegian School of Man-
agement BI.  The committee met in Oslo in June 2002, had discussions with key offi-
cials at Norges Bank and the Ministry of Finance, and has worked on its report until
September 2002.
A realistic view of monetary policy
In order to evaluate the conduct of monetary policy, it is important to have a realistic
view of what monetary policy can and cannot achieve.  People typically ask too much
of monetary policy—no less in Norway than elsewhere.  In the long term, monetary
policy can only control nominal variables such as inflation and the nominal exchange
rate.  It is beyond the capacity of any central bank to increase the average level or the
growth rate of real variables such as GDP and employment, or to affect the average
level of the real exchange rate.  At best, monetary policy can reduce the variability of
real variables somewhat.  An attempt to increase the average level or growth rate of
GDP, or to maintain a real undervaluation of the currency, would trigger every-rising
inflation, at increasing cost to the economy in terms of less efficient resource alloca-
tion and arbitrary and inequitable redistributions of income and wealth.  For these rea-
sons, an increasing number of countries have specified low and stable inflation, “price
stability,” as the primary goal for monetary policy.
In the short and medium term, monetary policy has effects on both nominal and real
variables.  However, the complex transmission mechanism of monetary policy, vary-
ing lags and strength of the effects through different channels, unpredictable shocks
and inherent uncertainty combine to prevent fine-tuning.
Best-practice inflation targeting
There is considerable agreement among policy makers, academics and researchers in
the monetary-policy area that so-called flexible inflation targeting is the best mone-
tary-policy setup.  Then inflation is stabilized around a low inflation target in the me-
dium term rather than at the shortest possible horizon, and a gradual and measured
policy response avoids creating unnecessary variability in the real economy.  Any re-
quired real exchange-rate adjustments are achieved through a floating exchange rate.
Because of shocks, uncertainty and imperfect control, considerable variability may
remain in the real economy, especially for small, open and less diversified economies
like Norway.  Best-practice central banks that have adopted flexible inflation targeting
include the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of England and Sveriges Riks-
bank.  We believe these banks provide a relevant standard of comparison for the con-
duct of monetary policy in Norway.
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Fiscal policy and real appreciation
Of special importance to Norway is the fact that a permanent future fiscal expansion,
which is implied by the new guidelines for fiscal policy and the phase-in of the oil
revenues, is likely to lead to a permanent real appreciation of the krone, a current in-
crease in the neutral real interest rate and an even larger real appreciation of the cur-
rency in the short and medium term.  This real appreciation is an equilibrium response
of the economy to the new fiscal-policy situation and the related increased relative
demand for output and resources of the sector producing nontradable goods and serv-
ices (the sector sheltered from international competition).  It will imply reduced com-
petitiveness of the tradable-goods sector in Norway (the export and import-competing
sectors exposed to international competition) and will most likely lead to reduced out-
put, employment and profits in the tradable-goods sector.  Attempts to delay such an
equilibrium adjustment of the real exchange rate by stabilizing the nominal exchange
is likely to be quite costly and result in more variable inflation and output gap, with-
out in the end preventing the real appreciation of the currency.
The institutional framework
With regard to the institutional framework for monetary policy, there is considerable
agreement among central bankers, academics and researchers in the areas of political
economy and monetary policy that the institutional framework that is best designed to
achieve the short- and long-term goals for monetary policy in a democratic society is
one with (1) a legislated mandate of price stability, (2) operational independence for
the central bank in fulfilling the mandate, and (3) accountability structures that make
the central bank accountable to the government or the parliament for fulfilling the
mandate.  During the 1990s, central-bank legislation in many countries has been re-
formed to meet these requirements.
With regard to the institutional framework for monetary policy in Norway, we find
that it has considerable weaknesses.  There is no legislated mandate for price stability.
Although Norges Bank in practice has considerable operational independence, this
independence is insufficiently safeguarded in the central-bank act.  There is no ex-
plicit accountability structure according to which Norges Bank can be held account-
able for its policy.  In a well-known international comparison of central-bank legisla-
tion, Norges Bank is ranked as the least independent central bank among the deve l-
oped economies.  With regard to the institutional framework, we have the following
recommendation:
· A full-fledged institutional reform should be undertaken, similar to those that have
been accomplished in the U.K. or Sweden.  The reform should specify a mandate
for price stability, operational independence, and accountability for Norges Bank.
Within the existing legislative framework, however, there are several potential im-
provements that we recommend:
· In order to resolve the inherent inconsistency between exchange-rate stability and
low and stable inflation for Norway, the references to exchange-rate stability in
the monetary-policy guidelines should be deleted.  (More precisely, the first sen-
tence should be deleted and the second sentence moved to after the fifth sentence.)
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· The appointments to the Executive Board should be of experts on monetary policy
and related areas, for instance, macroeconomics and financial markets, so that the
members can independently contribute to the achievement of the announced ob-
jectives for monetary policy.
· The custom to invite political parties to nominate members to the Executive Board
should be discontinued, in order to avoid the risk of sectoral, political or special-
interest representation and related risks of deadlocks or policy directed to special
interests rather than the country as a whole.
· Nonattributed minutes and attributed voting records from the Executive Board
should be published, in order to strengthen the accountability and further improve
transparency.  These minutes should note without attribution to individual mem-
bers which issues were discussed and what arguments were presented, as well as
how individual members have voted.
· The essential material on monetary policy submitted to or formulated by the Ex-
ecutive Board, for instance, the Strateginotat (Notes on Strategy) outlining policy
for the next four months, should be published, in order to strengthen accountabil-
ity and further improve transparency.
· Several additional improvements to strengthen the accountability of Norges Bank
should be undertaken:  (1) An evaluation by the Ministry of Finance of how Nor-
ges Bank has conducted monetary policy and achieved the stated objectives for
monetary policy should be included in the Kredittmelding (the report by the Min-
istry of Finance to the Storting).  (2) Regular hearings on monetary policy should
be held in the Storting with the governor and other officials of Norges Bank, with
the assistance of experts appointed by the Storting.  (3) An annual or biannual
conference on monetary policy in Norway should be held, financed by Norges
Bank but organized independently, for instance, by an academic institution, and
open to the general public and media.  At such a conference, papers evaluating
monetary policy by the Bank could be presented by national and international ex-
perts followed by comments by Bank officials and public discussion.
The conduct of monetary policy
When it comes to the conduct of monetary policy, we believe Norwegian monetary
policy is in very good hands.  The Bank has a very competent and highly trained top
management and staff.  The top management and many in the staff has long experi-
ence of economic policy, both monetary and fiscal policy.  The Bank has a long tradi-
tion of academic research and analysis.  Although the Bank has a short experience of
inflation targeting, for several years before inflation targeting was introduced, it or-
ganized conferences and meetings on monetary policy, including inflation targeting,
with academic researchers and central-bank officials from many countries.  In this
way the Bank built up an understanding of, and a competence in inflation targeting.
We believe the Bank’s Inflation Reports, the speeches by Bank officials and pub-
lished articles and working papers by the Bank clearly demonstrate the high quality of
the Bank’s analysis and understanding.  The Bank gives the impression of being a
very competent and enthusiastic newcomer to the inflation-targeting camp, and it is
our firm view that it masters the insights required for successful inflation targeting.
Overall, we believe Norges Bank is conducting monetary policy in line with the best
international practice, like that demonstrated by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand,
the Bank of England and the Riksbank.  Nevertheless, we would like to recommend a
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number of improvements to the conduct of monetary policy, which if undertaken
would in several cases push the frontier of best-international-practice inflation target-
ing further out:
· Inflation projections should generally be done conditional on the Bank’s preferred
instrument-rate path; that is, conditional on its best forecast of its future interest-
rate settings.  This would normally be a time-varying instrument-rate path.  The
assumed exchange-rate path should also normally be the Bank’s best forecast of
the future exchange rate, also normally a time-variable path.  This would avoid
some problems and inconsistencies associated with the current standard assump-
tion of constant interest and exchange rates.  It may also make monetary policy
more predictable and improve the Bank’s communication with the market.
· The central projections should be the mean projections (the probability-weighted
average outcome) rather than mode projections (the most likely outcome).  This is
in line with established economic theory, which says that it is the mean forecast
rather than the mode forecast that is relevant for decisions.  This would normally
make the somewhat cumbersome adjustment of the mode projection to the balance
of risk unnecessary, and the fan charts for the projections would mainly be used to
illustrate the uncertainty of the projections.
· The Bank should construct and publish projections of potential output, actual out-
put and hence the output gap, conditional on time-variable instrument-rate paths.
In this way the Bank can better reach the most desirable compromise between in-
flation variability and output-gap variability and the resulting compromise will be
more open to external scrutiny.
· The emphasis on the precise two-year horizon of inflation projections on target
should be reduced.  Instead, the Bank should find the projections of inflation, the
output gap and the corresponding instrument-rate path that the Bank thinks would
achieve the best compromise between inflation stability and output-gap stability.
These projections should be published in the Inflation Report and the Bank should
set its instrument rate accordingly.  These projections will then be the Bank’s best
unconditional forecast of future inflation, output gap and instrument rate. Pub-
lishing them will maximize the impact on private-sector expectations and thereby
implement monetary policy more effectively.  Publishing them also opens the
Bank’s projections for more precise external scrutiny.  The fan charts around the
projections should be constructed and interpreted as the Bank’s best unconditional
estimate of the uncertainty in the projections, thus conditional on its own future
policy response.
· The Bank’s analysis and explanations might benefit from further use of the con-
cepts of potential output, output gap and neutral real interest rate.
· The Bank could be more explicit about the weight it puts on output-gap stability
relative to inflation stability.
The debate on monetary policy and currency appreciation
The krone has appreciated strongly in both nominal and real terms.  We find the real
appreciation of the krone a logical outcome of the new guidelines for fiscal policy,
which imply a permanent future fiscal expansion.  This is likely to be accompanied by
not only a permanent real appreciation of the krone but an even stronger current real
appreciation and a higher neutral real interest rate.   These adjustments are equilib-
rium adjustments of the real economy to the new fiscal policy.  Thus, they occur in-
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dependently of monetary policy, and cannot be prevented by monetary policy.
Monetary policy might delay the real appreciation somewhat by focusing on stabiliz-
ing the nominal exchange rate instead of inflation and the output gap.  Perhaps such
monetary policy could delay the real appreciation a few quarters or perhaps a year or
so.  Such a monetary policy, by being in the short run more expansionary than current
policy by Norges Bank, would in the present situation most likely lead to increasing
inflation and an overheated economy.  The real appreciation induced by fiscal policy
would then arise through an increase in the price level.  As discussed in the text of the
report, historically such policies, because of the inherent inertia in inflation once it has
taken off, have lead to an over-appreciation and hence overvaluation of the currency,
and the boom has quickly turned to bust.
As far as we can see, in the current situation with a zero or positive output gap and
considerable inflationary pressure, Norges Bank is conducting inflation targeting ac-
cording to best international practice.  This requires a relatively high real interest rate,
but this is not surprising since the neutral real interest rate is likely to be higher, be-
cause of the future fiscal expansion and related current growth in consumption and
aggregate demand.
The current public debate about the real appreciation and monetary policy seems quite
confused.  Several recent debaters do not seem to understand the relation between the
real appreciation and fiscal policy and the limitations of monetary policy.  Arguably,
the Bank’s motivation for the de facto inflation target from 1999 may have contrib-
uted to the confusion.  There, inflation equal to that in Europe was motivated as a way
to achieve long-run stability in the exchange rate.  This argument relies on long-term
purchasing-power parity, that is, the long-term real exchange rate is stable.  However,
in an oil economy where oil revenues sooner or later will be phased in, long-term pur-
chasing power is unlikely to apply.  Indeed, as argued above, a permanent fiscal ex-
pansion may trigger a permanent real appreciation of the currency.  Although this is
well known by the Bank, arguably the Bank could explain the current situation with
even more clarity.  Thus, we recommend:
· The Bank should more clearly explain the limits of monetary policy in relation to
the real adjustment of the Norwegian economy that is likely to take place due to
the new guidelines of fiscal policy and, in particular, explain that monetary policy
cannot be expected to prevent the associated real appreciation of the krone.
Research at the Bank
Norges Bank has a strong research tradition.  Its Research Department plays a leading
role in Norwegian macroeconomic research.  The department is also very strong in
time-series econometrics and the economics of banking.
The Bank is somewhat unusual among inflation-targeting central banks in that the
main economic model used for projections and simulations, RIMINI, is largely an
empirical so-called reduced-form model that generalizes the empirical properties of
Norwegian data.  Most other inflation-targeting central banks instead to a large extent
use structural models that are closer to macroeconomic theory and have equations that
have structural interpretations.  An inflation-targeting central bank needs to make
projections conditional on alternative instrument-rate settings, for instance, instru-
ment-rate paths.  Doing this in a reduced-form model is associated with inherent
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problems, especially whether the reduced-form model is invariant to the alternative
instrument-rate paths.  A mostly empirical model is also very sensitive to the problem
of being estimated on data from a different monetary-policy regime, in the Norwegian
case from periods of exchange-rate targeting and interest-rate regulation.
Although the Bank and individual researchers there have already produced impressive
research on the theory and practice of inflation targeting, we believe even more re-
sources should be shifted to such activities.  Active research in these areas is of con-
siderable importance to the Bank.  The Bank must have its own competence and ca-
pacity for such research for several reasons:  Such competence and capacity is neces-
sary in order to rightly assess the quality and practicality of research related to mone-
tary policy and inflation targeting conducted at other central banks and academic in-
stitutions, which is a prerequisite for taking advantage of and applying such research
to Norwegian problems and issues of concern for Norges Bank.  Furthermore, such
competence and capacity is necessary to do research specifically directed to specific
Norwegian problems and issues of concern for Norges Bank.  Finally, such compe-
tence and capacity at the Bank will allow the Bank to contribute to the world-wide
development of monetary policy and inflation targeting.  Regarding the research at
Norges Bank, we recommend:
· Less emphasis on the Bank’s large reduced-form model RIMINI and more em-
phasis on the development of alternative structural models.
· An even stronger commitment to research at an academic level on issues related to
monetary policy in general and inflation targeting in particular.
· A high proportion of the working papers should be of such quality that they are
accepted for publication in international scientific journals.
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1  Introduction
This report on monetary policy and institutions in Norway, Norges Bank Watch 2002,
is an evaluation of the institutional framework for monetary policy, the new monetary
policy regime of March 2001, and the conduct of monetary policy by Norges Bank
under the new regime.  The report also includes a number of recommendations for
improvement of the institutional framework, the new guidelines and the conduct of
monetary policy.
The committee for Norges Bank Watch 2002 met in Oslo in two periods, during June
10-12 and September 17-19.  During the first period, we collected information, had a
meeting with officials of the Ministry of Finance, had several meetings with the man-
agement and staff of Norges Bank, and had a meeting with Hermod Skånland, former
Governor of Norges Bank.  We also had preliminary discussions within the committee
and outlined the main topics of our report.  The report was largely completed in the
period between the two periods and finalized during our second meeting in Oslo.
The report is organized in the following way.  Section 2 discusses the principles of
inflation targeting, a realistic view of what monetary policy can and cannot achieve,
the appropriate goals for monetary policy, and, importantly, the real-exchange rate
effects of fiscal policy.  Section 3 discusses optimal delegation of monetary policy,
the institutional framework for monetary policy in Norway, and the monetary-policy
guidelines of March 2001.  The section ends with a few recommendations for im-
provements of the institutional framework and the monetary-policy guidelines.  Sec-
tion 4 discusses the impact of fiscal policy and the phase-in of the oil revenues, the
new economic-policy framework of March 2001, and the lessons for the Norwegian
economy and the challenges for monetary policy.  Section 5 discusses how Norges
Bank conducts monetary policy, how inflation targeting can and should be evaluated,
the appropriateness of the Bank’s decision-making process, the Banks use of projec-
tions, the Bank’s individual decisions during the year and the Bank’s communication
of its policy.  The section ends with some recommendations for further improving the
analysis, conduct and communication of monetary policy.  Section 6 provides a dis-
cussion of the monetary-policy debate on the appreciation of the krone and the Bank’s
contribution to the debate, including a recommendation for improvement to the de-
bate.  Section 7 discusses the research at Norges Bank as well as giving some recom-
mendations about future research priorities.  Section 8 summarizes our conclusions
and lists our recommended improvements to monetary policy and institutions in Nor-
way.  An appendix reproduces the Regulation on Monetary Policy of March 29, 2001.
2  Principles of inflation targeting
2.1  A realistic view of monetary policy
A review of monetary policy should start from a realistic view of what monetary pol-
icy can and cannot do.  Such a view of monetary policy is also important in a discus-
sion of the appropriate goals for monetary policy and in understanding why an in-
creasing number of countries have selected low inflation as the primary goal for
monetary policy.  It is sometimes suggested that monetary policy is unfairly selected
as a scapegoat when other economic policies are to blame.  To assess the validity of
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such suggestions also requires a realistic view of what monetary policy can and can-
not do.1
The ultimate objective of economic policy is to guarantee and enhance the citizens'
welfare.  This is often expressed as a number of separate goals which contribute to the
citizens' welfare, for instance, efficient resource utilization, full and stable employ-
ment, high sustainable economic growth, price stability, equitable distribution of
wealth and income, regional balance and environmental protection.
Monetary policy is part of economic policy.  At first, one might think that monetary
policy should have the same goals as overall economic policy.  However, since
monetary policy only has sustained or persistent effects on a limited number of vari-
ables affecting economic welfare, it is more appropriate that monetary policy is as-
signed a subset of goals.  Specifying goals for monetary policy that it cannot achieve
would, of course, be unproductive and could even be counterproductive.  In order to
determine which goals are most suitable for monetary policy, one must therefore un-
derstand the effects of monetary policy and what monetary policy can achieve.
How monetary policy affects the economy
Monetary policy affects real and nominal variables through a number of channels, to-
gether referred to as the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.  Central banks
normally conduct monetary policy by setting a short nominal interest rate, the central
bank's instrument rate (in Norway, Norges Bank’s overnight deposit rate).  Suppose
the central bank lowers the instrument rate.  How is the economy affected?  In the
short term, domestic prices and domestic inflation in industrialized countries are rela-
tively slow to change (or sticky).  This means that private-sector inflation expecta-
tions for the short term are also relatively sticky.  This further implies that central
banks, by controlling the short nominal interest rate, can also affect the short real in-
terest rate: the difference between the short nominal rate and short-term inflation ex-
pectations.  Via market expectations of future real rates, longer real rates are also af-
fected.  Thus, the lowering of the instrument rate normally lowers short and longer
real interest rates. This will increase asset prices and aggregate demand for goods and
services.
Furthermore, a reduction in the short interest rate normally depreciates the domestic
currency and hence increases the nominal exchange rate (expressed as units of do-
mestic currency per unit of foreign currency).  Since domestic prices in practice are
sticky, the domestic currency also depreciates in real terms.  That is, the real exchange
rate also rises (the real exchange rate can be seen as the price of foreign goods and
services in terms of domestic goods and services or, alternatively, the price of tradable
goods in terms of nontradable goods and services).  The depreciation of the currency
implies that the domestic price of imported and exported final goods increases.  Since
these goods enter the Consumer Price Index (CPI), this means that CPI inflation in-
creases, the extent of which depends on these goods' share in the CPI.  This is the so-
called direct exchange-rate channel to CPI inflation.  This effect on CPI inflation
usually occurs within about a year, or even quicker.
                                                
11 Some of this discussion builds on Svensson (1997, 2001).
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The fall in short and longer real interest rates mentioned above will stimulate con-
sumption and investment and thereby increase aggregate demand.  Since output is
demand-determined in the short to medium run, higher aggregate demand will also
raise output.  This is the so-called real-interest-rate channel to aggregate demand.
The rise in the real exchange rate makes domestically produced goods less expensive
relative to foreign goods.  This increases demand for export and for import-competing
goods, which also adds to aggregate demand.  This is the exchange rate channel to
aggregate demand.  The effects through these two channels usually occur in about a
year or so.
The monetary-policy literature has also discussed a so-called credit channel to aggre-
gate demand.  It works in the same direction as the pure real-interest-rate effect on
aggregate demand.  For simplicity, we can therefore include the credit channel in the
above real-interest-rate channel to aggregate demand.  The real-interest-rate channel
also includes effects via changes in wealth, for instance, changes in the stockmarket
value due to interest-rate changes.
The impact of monetary policy on inflation
Having traced the transmission channels to aggregate demand, let us discuss the ef-
fects on domestic inflation: the rate of change in the prices of the domestically pro-
duced goods and services.  (Inflation in domestically produced tradable and nontrad-
able final goods and services is the main component of CPI inflation; another sub-
stantial component is inflation in imported final goods.)  As mentioned above, nor-
mally we consider actual output as determined mainly by aggregate demand in the
short and medium term.  Potential output is the hypothetical output level that would
result in the absence of price and wage stickiness.  It is largely determined by factors
other than monetary policy. 2  The output gap is the difference between current output
and potential output.  It can be seen as a measure of general excess demand in the
economy.  The above transmission channels to aggregate demand are hence also
channels to the output gap.  The increase in aggregate demand and the output gap will
then lead to an increase in domestic inflation, because increased production increases
the costs of production and because increased demand allows firms to raise prices.
The increase in domestic inflation usually occurs within another year or so.  This is
the aggregate-demand channel to domestic inflation.
For a given output-gap level, domestic inflation is also independently affected by pro-
duction costs, for instance wage costs and costs of intermediate inputs, like oil and
raw materials.  The depreciation of the currency increases the cost of imported inter-
mediate inputs as well as imported final goods, and the reduced purchasing power of
wages may trigger increased wage demands.  This can be called the production-cost
channel to domestic inflation.  Finally, price and wage setting are affected by expec-
tations of future inflation, since the expected future price level are the natural starting
point for individual price and wage setting.  This is the expectations channel to do-
                                                
2 Potential output is defined inclusive of frictions and imperfections other than price and wage sticki-
ness, for instance, imperfect competition and limited transmission of information in markets.  Thus,
potential output is lower than the hypothetical economically efficient output level that would result with
highly efficient markets and perfect competition.  Increasing potential output towards the efficient out-
put level is an important objective for structural policies aiming at improving the degree of competition
in markets for goods and services and the workings of the labor market.
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mestic inflation.  Any increased inflation expectations that may be generated by the
lowering of the instrument rate and the resulting increase in activity will then inde-
pendently add to the effect on domestic inflation.
Thus, a reduction in the central bank's instrument rate affects the economy through a
number of channels with different lags.  The exchange rate and short and longer inter-
est rates are usually immediately affected.  Within a year or less, there is an effect on
CPI inflation, through the direct exchange rate channel.  As this first effect is working
through, in about a year or so there is an increase in output and the output gap.
Through that linkage, within another year or so there is a second effect on CPI infla-
tion.  Both effects work in the same direction, namely to increase inflation.  However,
the lags mentioned are only very rough rules of thumb.  In practice, the lags and the
strength of the effects through the different channels vary across channels and over
time, and the effects are spread out over several quarters.  For instance, the lag and the
strength of the direct exchange rate effect on CPI inflation depend on the so-called
pass-through of exchange rate changes: the degree to which importers pass on ex-
change rate changes to buyers rather than absorbing them in their profit margins.  The
pass-through varies considerably depending on the circumstances, for instance, with
the perceived persistence of the exchange rate change, the size of the initial profit
margins, and the price sensitivity of demand for imports.
Furthermore, the economy is subject to a never-ending sequence of unanticipated
shocks and disturbances, directly and indirectly, to inflation and output.  These in-
clude price changes of raw materials and oil, shifts in international capital flows, pro-
ductivity changes, changes in fiscal expenditure and taxes, shifts in wage-setting be-
havior, etc.  Many of these shocks are quite difficult to identify, and many occur dur-
ing the lag between instrument adjustment and effects on output and inflation.  Thus,
it is worth emphasizing that the central bank's control over inflation, output and other
macro variables is quite imperfect.
The long-term effects of monetary policy
We have seen above how the central bank, by lowering its instrument rate, thereby
reducing the short real rate and the real exchange rate, can increase aggregate demand
and output for a few years.  Can the central bank indefinitely maintain a low instru-
ment rate and a depreciated currency in real terms and in this way stimulate the econ-
omy indefinitely?  The answer is definitely no.  In the longer term, the central bank
must set its instrument rate so that on average the short real rate is equal to the aver-
age neutral real interest rate.  The neutral real interest rate is the equilibrium real rate
that is consistent with output equal to potential output.  It is largely determined by
factors other than monetary policy.  If the central bank tries to maintain a short real
rate below the neutral real rate for too long, aggregate demand outstrips potential out-
put, the economy becomes overheated, and inflation increases to high single-digit,
then double-digit inflation, and eventually hyper-inflation. 3  As history has demon-
strated several times, a hyper-inflationary situation eventually results in a breakdown
                                                
3 The mirror image of this is a rapidly increasing rate of growth of the monetary base. In order to
maintain the short real interest rate below the neutral rate, the central bank has to inject money into the
economy at a rapidly increasing rate. At higher inflation rates, this money-growth channel to inflation
becomes dominant.
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of the market system and a severe economic and financial crisis.  Thus, sustained
stimulation of the real economy through monetary policy is not a feasible option.
In the long term, monetary policy can only control nominal variables such as inflation
and the exchange rate.  In the long term, monetary policy cannot increase the average
level or the growth rate of real variables such as GDP and employment, or affect the
average level of the real exchange rate.  There is evidence that monetary policy that
leads to high and/or variable inflation is harmful to the real economy and to economic
growth, by making the market mechanism work less well and by creating unnecessary
uncertainty.  However, once monetary policy brings inflation down to relatively low
and stable levels, monetary policy has no long-term effects on the average level and
average growth rate of real variables.  Nevertheless, monetary policy can affect the
variability of some real variables, as further discussed below.
2.2  Suitable goals for monetary policy
In the long run, output fluctuates around potential output, which is determined by
factors other than monetary policy. 4 Thus, there is a conspicuous difference between
output targets and inflation targets for monetary policy.  Whereas a long-run inflation
target for monetary policy makes eminent sense and can be achieved, a long-run level
or growth target for output does not make sense for monetary policy, because it can-
not be achieved.  Put differently, in contrast to the inflation target, the long-run output
target is not subject to monetary policy choice.  Instead it is given by potential output,
which is largely independent of monetary policy.  In the long term, monetary policy
can at best provide a stable environment for the real economy.  However, the fact that
monetary policy has effects on the level of real variables in the short and medium
term creates considerable tensions and temptations that need to be faced and handled.
A crucial ingredient in a stable environment for the real economy is a nominal anchor:
an anchor for the nominal variables and private-sector expectations of future nominal
variables.  An increasing number of countries have found that price stability, in the
sense of low and stable inflation, provides the best nominal anchor.  The reason is that
the alternative, higher inflation has serious negative consequences.  In practice, higher
inflation always comes with higher variability in inflation.  High and variable infla-
tion impairs the capacity of the market mechanisms to achieve efficient resource allo-
cation, and the ensuing uncertainty makes it more difficult for firms, consumers and
savers to make the right decisions.  It leads to arbitrary and inequitable redistributions
of incomes and assets, for instance, a shift away from small savers to professional in-
vestors and from tenants to owners of houses and property.  Inflation is effectively
theft from small savers and low-income groups.  High inflation has no lasting positive
effects, and the adverse effects eventually become unbearable.  Numerous historical
experiences have demonstrated that bringing inflation down from a high level is
costly; as a rule, a recession with high unemployment is required.  Accordingly, it is
important to avoid letting inflation take off in the first place.  For these reasons, an
increasing number of countries have specified low and stable inflation as the primary
goal for monetary policy.
                                                
4 However, as already noted, bad and volatile monetary policy may well create a volatile and uncertain
economic environment that deters investment and hence growth in potential output.
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However, completely disregarding the real consequences of monetary policy in the
short and medium term and focusing exclusively on controlling inflation at the short-
est possible horizon would have bad consequences.  This policy has been called “strict
inflation targeting” in the literature.  In practice, in an open economy, it would mean
relying almost exclusively on the direct exchange rate channel to CPI inflation de-
scribed above, since it has the shortest lag.  For instance, any disturbance to domestic
inflation that could arise from a number of different sources would be countered by
attempts to move the exchange rate so as to let the domestic price of imported and ex-
ported final goods adjust to stabilize CPI inflation.  This would require aggressive and
volatile policy and lead to considerable volatility in interest rates and the nominal and
real exchange rate, which would contribute to increased volatility of output, and
surely be detrimental to welfare.
A more moderate policy, called “flexible inflation targeting” in the literature, main-
tains that the primary goal of monetary policy is to achieve low inflation in the form
of an inflation target, but it is recognized that some weight should be given to stabi-
lizing the business cycle and, consequently, stabilizing output movements around po-
tential output.  In practice, this means taking a somewhat more gradual and more
moderate approach to monetary policy, aiming to achieve the inflation target at a
somewhat longer horizon (say 2-3 years) than would be technically feasible (perhaps
3-4 quarters).  It also means accepting that inflation will, in the short term, deviate,
sometimes quite a bit, from the inflation target.  This approach also relies more on the
aggregate demand channel than the direct exchange rate channel to inflation.
2.3  The tradeoff between inflation variability and output variability
The tradeoff between inflation variability and output-gap variability and the choice
between strict and flexible inflation targeting have been discussed extensively in the
monetary-policy literature, for instance, in several papers presented at the Jackson
Hole conferences in 1996 and 1999 (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 1996,
1999).  The tradeoff is often illustrated as in figure 2.1, with inflation variability
around a given inflation target measured along the horizontal axis and output-gap
variability measured along the vertical axis.  The intersection of the axes corresponds
to zero variability of inflation and the output gap, that is, inflation always equal to the
inflation target and the output gap always equal to zero.  Because of the complex
transmission mechanism of monetary policy, unpredictable shocks, imprecise control
and inevitable uncertainty, zero variability is a completely infeasible outcome.  In-
stead, the curve shows the most efficient and feasible combinations of inflation and
output-gap variability that monetary policy can achieve.  Points above and to the right
of the curve correspond to inefficient monetary policy, where either inflation variabil-
ity or output-gap variability, or both, could be reduced by better monetary policy.
Points below and to the left of the curve correspond to outcomes that are infeasible.
The point SIT corresponds to strict inflation targeting, when the central bank concen-
trates on stabilizing inflation without considering the consequences for output-gap
variability.  It results in the lowest feasible variability of inflation but high variability
of the output gap.  A point like FIT corresponds to flexible inflation targeting, where
the central bank puts some weight on stabilizing output-gap variability.  It leads to
somewhat increased inflation variability but reduced output-gap variability.  The point
SOT, to the right outside the figure, corresponds to “strict output-gap targeting,” when
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the central bank puts all weight on stabilizing the output gap.  It would lead to very
high inflation variability.
Figure 2.1.  The tradeoff between inflation variability and output-gap variability
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Discussions among policymakers, experts and researchers in the monetary-policy area
have by now resulted in considerable agreement that flexible inflation targeting is the
best compromise for monetary policy.  There is also general agreement that inflation-
targeting central banks in industrialized countries in practice conduct policy in this
way.  That is, they aim to stabilize inflation around the inflation target but also to
some extent stabilize output around potential output—acknowledging that because of
the tradeoff, unpredictable shocks, uncertainty and unavoidably imperfect control
there will always remain some variability in both inflation and the output gap.  For a
small, open, oil-producing and less diversified economy like Norway, the remaining
variability is likely to be substantial.
However, one important mechanism for improving the tradeoff is by achieving credi-
bility, in the sense of anchoring inflation expectations on the inflation target.  Shocks
to inflation expectations are historically an important source of variability in inflation
and output, since shifts in inflation expectations have independent effects on future
inflation—recall the direct expectations channel to domestic inflation mentioned
above.  Shifts in inflation expectations also cause additional indirect disturbances to
output and inflation by affecting real interest rates and exchange rates.  As a result,
volatility in inflation expectations shifts the curve in figure 2.1 up and to the right and
worsens the variability tradeoff.  Conversely, more stable inflation expectations an-
chored on the inflation target improve the tradeoff, shift the curve down and to the
left, and allow inflation variability or output-gap variability (or both) to fall.  This is
also because inflation expectations anchored on the inflation target create a strong
tendency for actual inflation to revert to the inflation target and, everything else equal,
mean that monetary policy needs to be less active.  Interest rates and output need to
move less to counter unfavorable movements in inflation expectations.  The economy
is to some extent put on autopilot.  This situation is every inflation-targeting central
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banker's dream.  Although central bankers often may seem obsessed with credibility,
this obsession is for good reason.
The feasibility and desirability of exchange-rate stabilization
Inflation targeting in an open economy will include an element of implied exchange-
rate stabilization.  Independent movements in the exchange rate, due to shocks and
changes in international investors’ sentiments, for instance, will have, through the di-
rect and indirect exchange-rate channels discussed above, an impact on the CPI.  For
instance, through the direct exchange-rate channel to the CPI, an appreciation of the
currency will, everything else equal, reduce the domestic-currency price of the im-
ported final goods that enter the CPI and thereby lower CPI inflation.  An inflation
targeting-central bank would then to some extent prevent the lower inflation by more
expansionary policy, which would moderate the currency appreciation.  Importantly,
this implied exchange-rate stabilization is not for its own sake; it is derived from the
objectives of stabilizing inflation and the output gap.
A separate issue is the desirability and feasibility of independent stabilization of the
exchange rate, that is, stabilization of the exchange rate for its own sake.  It is cer-
tainly possible for the central bank to stabilize either the interest rate or the exchange
rate somewhat, at the cost of increased variability of inflation and/or the output gap.
Is it desirable for the central bank to do so?  Except in situations of financial fragility
with concerns about the stability of the payment and financial system, we find it diffi-
cult to see good reasons for such stabilization at the cost of increased inflation and
output-gap variability.
It is sometimes suggested that central banks have an additional instrument beyond the
instrument rate, namely so-called sterilized foreign-exchange interventions, and that
central banks can affect the exchange rate independently from the instrument rate.
More precisely, sterilized foreign-exchange interventions are central-bank purchases
and sales of foreign exchange (in practice, foreign-currency treasury bills) while
maintaining the instrument rate at an unchanged level (which then may require coor-
dinated open-market operations (in practice repurchase transactions in domestic treas-
ury bills) in the domestic money market to undo (sterilize) the impact on the domestic
money supply).  A nonsterilized foreign-exchange intervention allows the intervention
to change the instrument rate and is equivalent to a standard open-market operation to
adjust the instrument rate.  The result of much research and practical experience is
that sterilized foreign-exchange interventions normally have only small and short-
lived effects.  The experience from sterilized interventions by Norges Bank does not
contradict this view.  Research and experience has, however, that there is one situa-
tion when sterilized interventions may have more substantial effects, namely when
they are interpreted as signals or threats of future interest-rate changes.  But a trans-
parent central bank has much better ways of sending such signals.
There is no evidence that sterilized foreign-exchange interventions by themselves
could have any material effect on exchange rate variability.  We see no reason why a
transparent inflation-targeter should undertake foreign-exchange interventions rather
than standard open-market operations.
Increased credibility in the sense of increasingly stable inflation expectations around
the inflation target will reduce a major source of shocks to exchange rates.  Thus, suc-
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cessful and credible flexible inflation targeting is likely to contribute to less variability
of exchange rates.  However, exchange rates are by nature volatile asset prices and are
affected by a number of shocks beyond inflation expectations.  Such shocks will con-
tinue to cause unavoidable exchange-rate variability under inflation targeting.
Furthermore, currency markets are notorious for inducing both temporary and more
permanent exchange-rate movements that are difficult to understand and often seem
quite irrational.  During the first few years of inflation targeting in Sweden, the krona
appeared to many observers and to Sveriges Riksbank to be priced surprisingly low
by international currency markets.  During the inflation-targeting regime of the U.K.,
the pound appears to many observers and to the Bank of England to be priced sur-
prisingly high.  When international currency markets persistently price a currency
above or below what seems to be a more reasonable real exchange rate, the only rea-
sonable monetary policy seems to be to accept and live with this.  For reasons dis-
cussed above, attempts by monetary policy to affect a real exchange rate in the long
term are normally doomed to fail and only bring further costs in terms of increased
inflation and output-gap variability.
But is it not possible to stabilize short-term movements in the real exchange rate
without attempting to stabilize it at some particular level in the long run?  In theory it
is possible to add another “stabilization objective,” namely the stability of the real ex-
change rate around its equilibrium rate.  Furthermore, this equilibrium real exchange
rate is ever-shifting due to shocks that change the underlying real equilibrium of the
economy.  Estimating the equilibrium real exchange rate is therefore a substantial
challenge.  Also, any stabilization of the real exchange rate would normally imply
more variability of inflation and output gap.  In practice, stabilization of the real ex-
change rate around an estimated time-varying real exchange rate is likely to be too
ambitious and fraught with difficulties.  Realistically, inflation targeting central banks
will have to abstain from any real exchange-rate stabilization beyond that implied by
the real exchange rate effects on inflation and the output gap.
2.4  Fiscal expansion and the real exchange rate
Norway is unique among the industrialized countries in its large oil revenues and the
strong financial position of the government, due to these revenues and the Govern-
ment Petroleum Fund (the fund of accumulated oil revenues that the government has
invested abroad).  As discussed in more detail in section 4, the new guidelines for fis-
cal policy of March 2001 imply a gradually more expansionary fiscal policy in the
future, with great temptations and risks for discretionary even more expansionary
policy.  A fiscal expansion is likely to lead to a real appreciation of the krone.  One
way to see this is to note that increased fiscal expenditure will to a large extent fall on
domestically produced goods and services, especially private and public services.  In-
creased demand for nontradable goods and services will lead to an increase in their
relative price to tradable goods.  The increase in this relative price serves to attract
labor and other productive resources from the sectors producing traded goods and
services, for instance, manufactures, to the sectors producing nontradable goods and
services.  This process will show up as reduced competitiveness of the tradable-goods
sector in Norway and will most likely lead to reduced output, employment and profits
in the tradable-goods sector.
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The rise in the relative price of nontradable goods corresponds to a fall in the real ex-
change rate and thus a real appreciation of the krone.  It is a logical consequence of a
fiscal expansion. 5  Furthermore, a permanent fiscal expansion, which is implied by
the new guidelines, is likely to lead to a permanent real appreciation as well as, as we
shall see, an even larger real appreciation in the short and medium term. 6
The increased future aggregate demand will imply increased future output and in-
come.  Then, Norwegian households anticipate higher disposable incomes in the fu-
ture, either from increased demand and income or from lower taxes in the future.  Via
a wealth effect, this will tend to increase current consumption and aggregate demand.
Keeping current consumption and aggregate demand in balance with current output
and avoiding an overheated economy requires a higher real interest rate, correspond-
ing to a higher neutral real interest rate, in order to induce the corresponding amount
of saving. 7
A permanent real appreciation and increased real interest rate in the short and medium
term will, everything else equal, lead to an even larger current real appreciation, a real
exchange-rate overshooting.  The reason is that the krone has to appreciate to such a
high level that it can depreciate in real terms to the long-term permanent level.  This
way, for international investors, the real return from investing in Norway, taking into
account both the real interest rate in Norway and the real depreciation of the krone,
will remain approximately equal to the real return in the rest of the world.  This is an
equilibrium condition in the international capital market.
Importantly, these adjustments of the real exchange rate and the real interest rate are
equilibrium adjustments of the real economy due to the anticipated future fiscal ex-
pansion, independent of monetary policy.  Monetary policy cannot prevent these ad-
justments; it can at most delay them somewhat, but at the cost of more inflation and,
as we shall see, probably a future recession.  When monetary policy is directed to-
wards maintaining low and stable inflation, the adjustment of the real exchange rate
occurs mainly through movements of the nominal exchange rate.  Adjustment of the
real exchange rate via the nominal exchange rate has the advantage that it can easily
be undone, if the underlying real sources of the adjustment in the economy, in this
case the fiscal expansion, changes.  For instance, if fiscal policy in the future should
change in a more restrictive direction, the real currency appreciation can be undone by
a nominal currency depreciation.
Monetary policy can delay the initial real currency appreciation somewhat, by focus-
ing on stabilizing the nominal exchange rate and preventing the nominal appreciation
of the currency, but, as we shall see, at a substantial cost to the economy.  Delaying
                                                
5 In line with the discussion in section 2.4, we do not imply that fiscal policy is  the only source of
movements in the real exchange rates in general and the recent appreciation of the krone in particular.
It is possible that recent strong real-wage growth in Norway will reduce future potential output and
potential employment and require a higher real interest rate and thus more contractionary monetary
policy to close the output gap.  The higher real interest rate then induces a current real appreciation.
6 Even in the very long run, there need not be constant returns to scale in the production of nontrade-
able goods and services, due to specific factors of production in limited supply and congestion effects.
Therefore, the real appreciation may persist also in the long run.
7 This is essentially the same kind of argument as the “new economy” with its increased output growth
implying a higher neutral real interest rate.
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the initial real appreciation involves easier monetary policy and initially a lower
nominal interest rate.  Because the nominal price level is sticky in the short run, this
would delay the real appreciation for some time.  However, after a few quarters, the
easier monetary policy would result in increasing inflation, especially since the ad-
justment of the real exchange rate and the real interest rate to avoid an overheated
economy has been delayed.  Then, the required real appreciation instead arises
through an increase in the domestic price level in an overheated economy, rather than
through a fall in the nominal exchange rate.  Eventually, the same real appreciation
has been achieved through a rise in inflation and a resulting increase in the price level.
However, achieving the real appreciation through inflation in an overheated economy
has the large disadvantage that inflation in practice has considerable inertia.  Thus, the
high inflation will stay for some time.  The higher inflation has the undesirable conse-
quences we have already noted above, that it brings more uncertainty, impairs the ca-
pacity of the market mechanisms to achieve efficient resource allocation, makes it
more difficult for firms, consumers and savers to make the right decisions, and leads
to arbitrary and inequitable redistributions of incomes and wealth.  Furthermore, the
inertia in inflation means that the real-exchange-rate adjustment can go too far, lead-
ing to an excess real appreciation and hence an overvalued currency.  Then a boom
and expansion can quickly turn into bust and contraction.  A real depreciation is then
necessary to undo the overvalued currency, and with a stable nominal exchange rate,
this requires deflation and a fall in the domestic price level and nominal wages, which
normally requires a deep recession.  The experience of the Nordic countries and the
U.K. in the late 1980s and early 1990s give excellent examples of this tendency to
boom and bust under a fixed exchange rate.  With a flexible exchange rate, the desired
real depreciation instead comes through a quick rise in the exchange rate, a nominal
depreciation.  This is indeed the reason why monetary policy aimed at low and stable
inflation with a flexible exchange rate is considered superior to a fixed exchange
rate—and indeed the reason why the fixed exchange rate was effectively abandoned
in the late 90s in Norway (and earlier in Finland, the U.K. and Sweden).
Thus, it is quite costly and eventually futile to use monetary policy in an attempt to
prevent equilibrium adjustment of the real exchange rate due to underlying changes in
the real economy.
2.5  Summary
In the long term, monetary policy can only control a nominal variable, such as either
inflation or the nominal exchange rate.  It cannot increase the average level or the
growth rate of real variables such as GDP and employment, or affect the average level
of the real exchange rate.  At best it can reduce the variability of real variables some-
what.  In the short and medium term, monetary policy has effects on both nominal and
real variables.  However, any fine-tuning is prevented by the complex transmission
mechanism of monetary policy, varying lags and strength of the effects through dif-
ferent channels, unpredictable shocks and inherent uncertainty.  There is general in-
ternational support for a regime of flexible inflation targeting, where inflation is sta-
bilized around a low inflation target in the medium term rather than at the shortest
possible horizon, a gradual and measured policy response avoids creating unnecessary
variability in the real economy, and required real exchange-rate adjustments are
achieved through a flexible exchange rate.
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A permanent future fiscal expansion is likely to lead to a permanent real appreciation
of the currency, a current increase in the neutral real interest rate and a larger short-
run than long-run real appreciation of the currency.  Attempts to delay such an equi-
librium adjustment of the real exchange rate by stabilizing the nominal exchange is
likely to be quite costly and result in more variable inflation and output gap, without
in the end preventing the real exchange rate movements.
3  Optimal delegation of monetary policy and the institu-
tional framework for monetary policy in Norway
3.1  Optimal democratic delegation of monetary policy
The situation in Norway differs from that in other European countries with regard to
the central bank’s independence and the extent to which monetary policy is (formally)
delegated (we also discuss below to what extent monetary policy is delegated in prac-
tice in Norway).  This motivates a discussion of the optimal delegation of monetary
policy in a representative democracy.
In democracies, the government and the parliament are ultimately responsible for
economic policy and accountable to the people.  This is also the case for monetary
policy.  It does not preclude, however, that the political authorities may find it appro-
priate to delegate the formulation and implementation of the policy to independent
authorities when this is considered the most efficient means of achieving the objec-
tives of economic policy.  A representative democracy is in itself based on delega-
tion—the people delegates legislative powers to parliament, but holds the political
authorities accountable through general elections; the administration of justice is
delegated to independent courts which are to judge in accordance with the laws
passed by parliament.
Delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank is obviously not a goal in
itself.  It is solely motivated by its advantages when it comes to achieving the eco-
nomic policy objectives.  What are these advantages?  This question has been thor-
oughly analyzed in academic research.  There is also plenty of practical experience
from different countries.  Research and practical experience show that the most im-
portant parts of a successful delegation can be summarized in three points:
(1) Mandate.  The political authorities define a clear goal for monetary policy, pref-
erably legislated, as is the case in an increasing number of countries.  According to
the discussion in section 2, low and stable inflation, with some weight on stability of
the output gap, is the most appropriate goal for monetary policy.
(2) Independence.  The central bank is given “operational independence” (sometimes
also called “instrument independence”), which implies two things.  First, the central
bank must have an independent management, so that it can pursue its monetary-policy
goal free of short-term political pressure from the government and from various inter-
est groups.  The terms of office and the principles for appointing and removing the
central bank’s management must be set up with a view to this.  Second, the central
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bank must be given full control over the instruments for monetary and exchange-rate
policy, that is, control over open market operations and foreign-exchange interven-
tions.
(3) Accountability.  An important condition, not only for democratic control but also
for efficient delegation, is that the central bank is held accountable to the political
bodies for the monetary policy conducted.  Accountability serves several purposes.  In
a democracy like Norway, it is a matter of principle that operational independence by
any agency is accompanied by accountability.  It also creates incentives for the central
bank to pursue the goals it has been assigned.  Accountability requires transparency,
both in the form of a clear goal for monetary policy and a transparent reporting sys-
tem for the central bank’s policy actions and the analysis that motivates these actions,
so that the bank’s performance can be evaluated by external observers.  The central
bank’s policy actions can, for instance, be reported and motivated in the central
bank’s publications, but also through subsequent—and public—questionings of the
central-bank management in parliament.  If the central bank is to be held genuinely
accountable, specific sanctions may be needed, in the event that the central bank does
not achieve the established goal in a satisfactory manner.  This is the case in New
Zealand, where the governor of the central bank is personally responsible for fulfilling
the goal for monetary policy, and he or she can be removed from office, if mistakes in
monetary policy result in the goals not being fulfilled.   In the U.K., if inflation devi-
ates more than one percentage point from the announced inflation target, the governor
of the Bank of England is obliged to send an open letter to the Chancellor of Excheq-
uer, stating the reasons for the breach, what action the Bank is taking to deal with it,
and when inflation is expected to return to the target.
Another important element of political and democratic control is an override clause.
In extreme circumstances, such as disasters or major international political or eco-
nomic disturbances, the government or parliament should have the power to quickly
issue new laws or decrees about monetary policy, temporarily absolving the central
bank of its obligation to pursue the previously announced goal, for instance, low in-
flation.  In view of democratic control, it is essential that this is made public and that
the central bank cannot be required to depart from the announced objective secretly.
This reduces the risk of short-term abuse, for instance by stimulating the economy
before a general election in order win votes in the short run.
What are the benefits of an executive delegation in relation to the three points above?
Decades of research and practical experience show that direct government control
over monetary policy entails, as a rule, great temptations to abuse monetary policy in
order to gain short-term benefits.  One may, for instance, be tempted to increase the
level of output and lower unemployment in the short-term, often also to gain political
advantages for the political party in power, not least in connection with general elec-
tions.
The general public, trade unions and firms—not least financial markets—sooner or
later realize the ramifications of these temptations.  This tends to lead to high inflation
expectations and thus high wage increases, high long interest rates and high actual
inflation.  Confronted with this, the government often finds the short-term costs too
high—in the form of recession—of conducting a tight monetary policy aimed at low
inflation.  The government therefore shifts towards an accommodating policy, thus
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allowing inflation to take off and the currency to fall.  The high inflation expectations
are thereby fulfilled.  The government’s repeated assertions that the goal of price sta-
bility remains firm may then easily lose credibility, and various explanations indicat-
ing that this is merely a temporary departure from long-run policy are not convincing.
Public announcements from the Swedish government and from the Riksbank during
the 1970s and the 1980s provide many such examples.
Delegating monetary policy according to the three points above is therefore a means
for parliament and the government of strengthening the credibility of the announced
policy.  It should be emphasized that the purpose of operational independence for the
central bank is not to achieve any other goal than the announced one; instead the prin-
ciple is to increase the likelihood of achieving the democratically established goal.
The experience of many countries reveals the advantages of such delegation (see, for
instance, Calmfors et al. (1997)).  Numerous studies show that countries with a clear
delegation of monetary policy to an operationally independent central bank have been
more successful in keeping inflation at bay, without sacrificing other economic policy
goals such as economic growth and stability of output and employment.
Given these experiences, many countries in Europe and in the rest of the world have
implemented institutional reforms in order to permit a clear delegation of monetary
policy.  This is the case for the countries that have entered the EMU, the Economic
and Monetary Union in Europe, but also for several countries in Europe outside the
Monetary Union, for instance, the U.K. and Sweden.
3.2  The institutional framework for monetary policy in Norway8
The institutional framework for monetary policy in Norway differs from the ideal
framework discussed above.  In Norway, there is no legislated goal for monetary
policy, and there is no formal operational independence of the central bank.  In an
international comparison of central-bank legislation by Cukierman (1992), Norges
Bank ranks as the least independent central bank among the developed countries.
Furthermore, Cukierman’s ranking was done before many countries all over the world
reformed their central-bank legislation in the direction of increased central-bank inde-
pendence.
The Central Bank Law (Sentralbank loven) was passed by the Storting (the Parlia-
ment) in 1985, before the modern discussion and reform of central-bank legislation,
and has not been changed since.  It states (section 2) that Norges Bank “shall conduct
its operations in accordance with the economic policy guidelines drawn up by the
government authorities and with the country's international commitments,” and that
“[b]efore the Bank makes decisions of particular importance, the matter shall be sub-
mitted to the Ministry of Finance.”  Furthermore, the government “may adopt resolu-
tions regarding the operations of the Bank.  Such resolutions may take the form of
general rules or instructions in individual cases.” Thus, the government has the right
to give direct instructions to Norges Bank, either in the form of general rules or spe-
                                                
8 Norges Bank Watch 2001 provides a more detailed discussion of the central bank legislation in Nor-
way.  Svensson (2001) provides a more detailed discussion of governance and committees of central
banks, with special reference to New Zealand.
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cific instructions in individual cases.  In particular, the government can in an instruc-
tion reject the Bank’s interest-rate decision.
The right of instruction of the government comes with several important checks,
though:  The instruction must be in the form of “King in Council,” which is a more
formal government decision than usual.  “The Bank shall be given the opportunity to
state its opinion before such resolutions are passed” in the form of a letter.  “The
Storting shall be notified of resolutions [by the government regarding the operations
of the Bank] as soon as possible.”  The notification must be public and include the
letter from the Bank.  After the Storting has received such a notification, it could in a
plenary session instruct the government to conduct an economic policy in line with
the views of the majority of the Storting and this way force the government to accept
the Bank’s interest-rate decision.  Clearly, there would be considerable public discus-
sion if right of instruction was used to overrule a decision by Norges Bank. The right
of instruction has never been formally used to overrule the Bank.
There has been some discussion of how the Central Bank Law is supposed to be ap-
plied (see Smith (1994)).  The understanding today seems to be that, if the govern-
ment instructs Norges Bank to act in opposition to the best judgment of the Bank, the
governor of Norges Bank will resign.
Regarding accountability, the Central Bank Law states that Norges Bank shall submit
annual reports and accounts to the government.  These reports shall be made available
to the Storting.  The Ministry of Finance shall report to the Storting concerning ac-
tivities in Norges Bank at least once a year, and more frequently if special circum-
stances dictate.  These reports are included in the Kredittmelding (the Credit Report),
an annual statement from the Ministry of Finance to the Storting.  This statement also
reports on a number of other public institutions in the credit markets.
The Kredittmeld ing includes the Bank’s own evaluation of its policy, but there is no
separate evaluation of the Bank’s policy by the Ministry of Finance.  There are no
regular hearings in the Storting or elsewhere with officials of Norges Bank.  Most of
the discussion of monetary policy in Norway occurs in the media and in academic re-
search and discussions.  Norges Bank Watch so far provides the only regular and more
thorough scrutiny of monetary policy and institutions in Norway.
The institutional framework in practice
In practice, fortunately, a system of delegation of monetary policy has evolved, which
implies that the government does not exercise direct control over monetary policy.
Instead, the government issues instructions in the form of general rules for monetary
policy, more precisely specifying the nature of the monetary policy regime and the
objectives of monetary policy, which apply for several years.  Thus, in March 29,
2001, the government issued a Regulation of Monetary Policy that specified an infla-
tion target of 2.5% for Norges Bank.
In practice, Norges Bank has significant operational independence, in the sense that it
independently decides what level of its instrument rate (the Bank’s overnight deposit
rate) is appropriate.  Before announcing and implementing its decision, it is still
obliged to inform the government through the Ministry of Finance.  As mentioned, the
government has never formally rejected the Bank’s instrument decision; doing so
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would have been a major political event.  Furthermore, if that would happen, the pre-
sumption is that the governor of Norges Bank would resign.  Thus, with a strong gov-
ernor and a strong reputation for Norges Bank, it would seem quite difficult for the
government to interfere with interest-rate decisions, once the government has issued a
regulation specifying the objectives of monetary policy.  On the other hand, a weak
governor and a weak Bank might of course adapt interest-rate decisions to what the
government is likely to prefer, in order to avoid conflict.
Even if in practice a suitable delegation of monetary policy has currently been estab-
lished, it is not safeguarded in the legislation about the institutional framework.  A
new government could interrupt the current practice and issue new instructions that
would fundamentally change the monetary-policy regime and even move to day-to-
day control of monetary policy, if the Storting does not object.  For instance, the gov-
ernment could any time instruct Norges Bank to weaken the krone to some specified
level and thereby take direct control over monetary policy.  Thus, a legislated reform
that would safeguard and strengthen the current practice would seem to be desirable.
The Executive Board
Monetary-policy decisions are made by the Executive Board of Norges Bank.  The
Board consists of seven members, appointed by the government.  The governor and
deputy governor are always members of the board.  They are appointed for terms of
six years, and can be once reappointed.  The other five members are appointed for
four-year terms.  Every year two or three members retire.  They can be reappointed to
a total term of 12 years.
There is no requirement that the five members must be experts in monetary policy or
related areas, like macroeconomics or financial markets.   Should Board members be
experts in monetary policy or nonexperts?  Nonexperts have the advantage that there
is a larger group of possible candidates to choose from, and therefore it is easier to
find respected candidates who would contribute to the general legitimacy of the com-
mittee.  However, a lack of expertise in monetary policy means reduced competence
for independent assessment and capacity to participate in the technical discussion re-
quired in efficient inflation targeting.  Nonexperts therefore easily become dominated
by committee members with more expertise.  There are thus good reasons to limit ap-
pointments to candidates with expertise in monetary policy, macroeconomics or fi-
nancial economics.  In line with this, the Bank of England has no nonexperts on its
Monetary Policy Committee, and all appointments to the new Executive Board of the
Riksbank in 1999 were experts (more recently a controversial political rather than
professional appointment has occurred).
This issue is related to whether monetary policy is a political or technical activity.  In
Norway, once the government has specified the objectives, monetary policy is over-
whelmingly a technical activity; how to best fulfill the stated objectives, more pre-
cisely, the given inflation target.  Then monetary policy is best done by experts.
This also implies that appointments to the Executive Board with the purpose of secto-
ral, political or other special-interest representation are mistaken.  Not only is it un-
necessary, but it brings special-interest conflicts into the Board, which might cause
deadlocks or risk policy serving special interests rather than the country as a whole.
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By custom, the main political parties represented in the Storting are invited to nomi-
nate candidates for the five members Executive Board other than the governor and
deputy governor.  As far as we know, the government has not opposed these nomina-
tions, except that the government has imposed limitations on the gender composition
of the Board.  The custom of inviting nominations from political parties has no legal
basis.  It seems to increase the risk of sectoral, political or special-interest appoint-
ments.  We therefore recommend that the custom be discontinued.
3.3  The monetary-policy guidelines
The current objectives for Norges Bank are specified in the new guidelines for mone-
tary policy, the Regulation on Monetary Policy adopted on March 29, 2001 (repro-
duced in appendix A.1).  The first three paragraphs read (the sentences have been
numbered for easy reference):
§ 1.
(1) Monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone’s na-
tional and international value, contributing to stable expectations concerning
exchange rate developments.  (2) At the same time, monetary policy shall un-
derpin fiscal policy by contributing to stable developments in output and em-
ployment.
(3) Norges Bank is responsible for the implementation of monetary policy.
(4) Norges Bank’s implementation of monetary policy shall, in accordance
with the first paragraph, be oriented towards low and stable inflation.  (5) The
operational target of monetary policy shall be annual consumer price inflation
of approximately 2.5 per cent over time.
(6) In general, the direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in
interest rates, taxes, excise duties and extraordinary temporary disturbances
shall not be taken into account.
§ 2.
Norges Bank shall regularly publish the assessments that form the basis for the
implementation of monetary policy.
§ 3.
The international value of the Norwegian krone is determined by the exchange
rates in the foreign exchange market.
In addition to these guidelines, the Stortingsmelding (the Storting Report) No. 29
from the Ministry of Finance of March, 2001 states that “[c]onsumer price inflation is
expected to remain within an interval of +/-1 percentage point around the target.”
The monetary-policy guidelines are not, unfortunately, internally consistent.  Sentence
(1) specifies stability in both the krone’s national value (which is the reciprocal of the
price level) and international value (which is the reciprocal of the nominal exchange
rate) as objectives for monetary policy.  Furthermore, the sentence says that monetary
policy should contribute to stable expectations about exchange rate developments.  As
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discussed in section 2, especially section 2.4, stability in the price level and the nomi-
nal exchange rate cannot be reconciled, especially when a fiscal expansion induces a
real currency appreciation.  Fortunately, sentences (3)-(6) resolve this conflict by
stating that monetary policy shall be oriented towards low and stable inflation and by
specifying an inflation target of 2.5% per year for CPI inflation adjusted for direct ef-
fects from interest rates, taxes, excise duties and extraordinary temporary distur-
bances.  Sentence (2) states that the Banks shall also put some weight on stable output
and employment.  Sentences (2)-(6) thus imply that the monetary policy is one of
flexible inflation targeting as discussed in section 2, except that it would be more pre-
cise to mention either the “output gap” or the “employment gap” (the gap between
output and potential output, and the gap between employment and potential employ-
ment) instead of “output and employment”.  Mentioning both gaps is redundant since
they are highly correlated.
A natural and logical improvement of the monetary-policy guidelines is to delete
sentence (1) and to move sentence (2) to after sentence (5).
3.4  Potential improvements of the institutional framework
The most important improvement of the institutional framework is a full-fledged in-
stitutional reform, requiring a new law for Norges Bank, as discussed above and
similar to those that have been undertaken in the U.K. or Sweden, with the three char-
acteristics emphasized above—a legislated mandate, operational independence and
accountability.  The setup in the U.K. where the government formulates the inflation
target would be most similar to the Norwegian tradition. 9  Thus, we recommend:
· A full-fledged institutional reform, similar to those that have been undertaken in
the U.K. or Sweden.  The reform should specify a mandate for price stability, op-
erational independence, and accountability for Norges Bank.
Within the existing legislative framework, there are, however, several potential im-
provements of the framework.  We recommend:
                                                
9 In February, 2002, Fremskrittspartiet (FrP) proposed a change to the Central Bank Law in Stortinget
(Fremskrittspartiet, 2002).  The main elements of the proposal are:
· The right of the Ministry of Finance to instruct Norges Bank should be removed.  The obligation to
consult the Ministry of Finance ahead of decisions must be removed.
· The inflation target should be implicitly stated in the law.  There should be no reference to ex-
change rate stability or level.
· The Bank should receive operational independence.
· The Bank should submit semi-annual or annual reports to the Parliament.
· The Government should appoint members of the Executive Board that have a high level of com-
petence and that are politically independent. Moreover, the Government should have the right to
replace board members that do not fully subscribe to the inflation target.
Thus, this proposal largely agrees with the conventional wisdom about the appropriate institutional
framework for monetary policy.  Nevertheless, the proposal was rejected by the Parliament in April.
The only votes in favor of the proposal were from the FrP itself.  The minister of finance stated in a
letter to the Storting that he wanted to consider some elements in the legal framework for Norges Bank
during 2002.
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· In order to resolve the inherent inconsistency between exchange-rate stability and
low and stable inflation for Norway, the references to exchange-rate stability in
the monetary-policy guidelines should be deleted.  (More precisely, the first sen-
tence should be deleted and the second sentence moved to after the fifth sentence.)
· The appointments to the Executive Board should be of experts on monetary policy
and related areas, for instance macroeconomics and financial markets, so that
members can independently contribute to the achievement of the announced ob-
jectives for monetary policy.
· The custom to invite political parties to nominate members to the Executive Board
should be discontinued, in order to avoid the risk of sectoral, political or special-
interest representation and related risks of deadlocks or policy directed to special
interests rather than the country as a whole.
· Nonattributed minutes and attributed voting records from the Executive Board
should be published, in order to strengthen the accountability and further improve
transparency.  These minutes should note without attribution to individual mem-
bers which issues were discussed and what arguments were presented, as well as
how individual members have voted.
· The essential material on monetary policy submitted to or formulated by the Ex-
ecutive Board, for instance, the Strateginotat (Notes on Strategy) outlining policy
for the next four months should be published, in order to strengthen accountability
and further improve transparency.
· Several additional improvements to strengthen the accountability of Norges Bank
should be undertaken:  (1) An evaluation by the Ministry of Finance of how Nor-
ges Bank has conducted monetary policy and achieved the stated objectives for
monetary policy should be included in the Kredittmelding (the report by the Min-
istry of Finance to the Storting).  (2) Regular hearings on monetary policy should
be held in the Storting with the governor and other officials of Norges Bank, with
the assistance of experts appointed by the Storting.  (3) An annual or biannual
conference on monetary policy in Norway should be held, financed by Norges
Bank but organized independently, for instance, by an academic institution, and
open to the general public and media.  At such a conference, papers evaluating
monetary policy by the Bank could be presented by national and international ex-
perts followed by comments by Bank officials and public discussion.
4  The impact of fiscal policy and the phase-in of oil revenues
4.1  Challenges for economic policy in Norway
In the last ten years, Norway’s economic growth and general macroeconomic per-
formance have been impressive.  The present purchasing-power corrected GDP per
capita is 46% above EU average.  The rate of unemployment has been below 4% for a
number of years, and inflation is under control.  Private consumption (purchasing
power corrected) is however not larger than the EU-average, reflecting that Norway
exports capital on a grand scale.
The government is becoming increasingly wealthy.  In 2000 and 2001, the general
government’s budget surplus was close to 15% of GDP.  Despite future population
aging and large expected future pension liabilities, the issue of fiscal policy
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sustainability is much less of a present concern in Norway compared to most other
European welfare states.  The accumulated funds represent a great opportunity for
Norwegian policy makers to insure and increase general welfare in the next decades.
Compared to other European governments, the Norwegian government has a lot more
room for fiscal maneuver.  This new fiscal freedom, however, also brings with it sev-
eral pitfalls:  Fiscal discipline may erode, leading to excessive and wasteful rent-
seeking, government bureaucratization and spending as well as distorting private
sector incentives to work and increase productivity.  The world oil price may drop and
remain low for a long time, undermining the sustainability of the Norwegian welfare
state.  Rent-seeking, lack of fiscal discipline and unsustainable policies has been the
normal scenario in many other economies that have relied heavily on oil exports.10
Looking ahead, Norwegian fiscal policy could become a lot more expansionary for
many years without even turning the government budget into a deficit.  And even if
fiscal deficits should reappear, there is a long way to go until the net asset position of
the government turns into net debt.  The increasing wealth of the government has in-
creased the demands and political pressure from various interest groups to cut taxes
and increase government employment and spending, a pressure that is hardly possible
to ignore for Norwegian governments that usually are weak and not even backed by a
stable majority in parliament.  If fiscal policy turns much more expansionary than the
present fiscal stance, monetary policy could come under great pressure.  In particular,
the new rule for fiscal policy from 2001 indeed implies that fiscal policy will become
more expansionary in the future, which is likely to lead to a sizeable real appreciation
of the krone.  In fact, this real appreciation, or part of it, may already have occurred.
In what follows we discuss the impact of fiscal policy and the phase-in of oil revenues
implied by the new guidelines for fiscal policy.  We first take a closer look at the new
economic policy framework that was established in April 2001, involving an inflation
target of 2.5% and a new fiscal-policy rule.  Then we discuss the impact of this for
monetary policy and the real exchange rate.
4.2  The new economic-policy framework
The “Solidarity Alternative”
During the last couple of years, the macroeconomic policy framework in Norway has
changed.  The former framework (the "Solidarity Alternative") was established in the
aftermath of the 1988-89 recession and the subsequent poor employment performance
in the beginning of the 1990s.  The main goal of that framework was to restore full
employment with low inflation, by a combination of central wage coordination (the
income policy cooperation with the organizations of the labor market) and active
counter-cyclical fiscal policy. 11  Monetary policy should aim at a stable exchange rate
against the ecu/euro as a nominal anchor.  After the speculative attack by the end of
                                                
10 An extreme example is Venezuela that used to have a share of oil exports in total exports of 90% and
a share of oil revenue in the government’s total revenue of 60%. The high oil price in the beginning of
the 1980s triggered an ambitious fiscal spending program that led to debt and currency crises when the
oil price plunged in 1986. During the turbulent 1980s, Venezuela’s GDP per capita declined by 18%,
see Hausmann (1999).
11 The name “Solidarity Alternative” refers to the solidarity (in centralized wage settlements) expected
of insiders in the labour market towards unemployed outsiders.
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1992, the exchange rate was no longer complete fixed, however, but allowed to fluc-
tuate around, at first, an unspecified target level and, from May 1994, a specified level
in terms of ecu and later euro.  This monetary-policy regime can be described as a
managed float.  No explicit target band for the exchange rate was announced.  Norges
Bank stabilized the krone around its unspecified target value by increasing or de-
creasing the interest rate if the krone was considered too weak or strong, respectively,
and in this way kept it not too far from what it used to be in 1993.  Fiscal policy was
assigned the sole responsibility for macroeconomic stabilization through active ag-
gregate demand management.  For this purpose, a budget-balance indicator was con-
structed that excludes net government income from the petroleum sector and is ad-
justed for cyclical components and some other transitory items.
During the recovery from the slowdown of the Norwegian economy in the beginning
of the 1990s, this framework served its purpose well.  During the 1996-1997 boom,
however, weaknesses became apparent.  The krone tended to appreciate in the boom,
and to prevent this, Norges Bank had to reduce its instrument rate.  Thus, by reducing
the interest rate in boom, monetary policy became pro-cyclical and further fueled the
boom.  This placed a large burden on fiscal policy:  It was supposed to counteract not
only the original overheating of the economy but also the expansionary effect of
monetary policy.  Table 4.1 presents two fiscal policy indicators for the period 1995-
2001.  From the first column we see that taxes paid by the mainland economy (ex-
cluding taxes on petroleum and shipping) did indeed increase faster than mainland
GDP from 1995 to 1997.  Moreover, government spending in % of mainland GDP
declined substantially during the same period.  As a result, total spending minus
mainland taxes declined from 9.8% to 5.7% of mainland GDP in 1997.  Therefore, it
is very likely that fiscal policy did have a counter-cyclical effect during the boom.
But it was not sufficient to prevent a very tight labor market, strong wage growth and
inflationary pressure.
For the minority government at the time, it was hardly politically possible to tighten
fiscal policy sufficiently under the prevailing circumstances.  Even if a stable majority
in parliament had supported the government, it is doubtful whether a sufficient tight-
ening of fiscal policy would have been feasible without some backing from monetary
policy.
Table 4.1.  Mainland taxes and total government spending, 1995-2001
(% of mainland GDP).
Year Mainland taxes (%) Total government
spending (%)
Spending less
mainland taxes (%)
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
46.3
47.4
48.2
47.7
49.0
49.4
-
56.1
55.5
53.9
53.7
54.9
55.1
55.6
9.8
8.1
5.7
6.0
5.9
5.7
-
Source:  National Budget 2002.
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Implicit inflation targeting
Thus, fiscal policy was not sufficiently contractionary, monetary policy with a fixed
exchange rate was effectively pro-cyclical, and the boom continued to build up and
increase tensions in the economy.  From 1999, the new governor of Norges Bank,
Svein Gjedrem, innovatively reinterpreted the fixed-exchange rate instruction from
the government as implying a long-run exchange-rate target, and furthermore stated
that the best way to achieve the long-run exchange rate target was to aim at inflation
at a level similar to that in the Euro zone.  This did away with the procyclical ten-
dency of a fixed exchange rate and allowed monetary policy to contribute to stabiliz-
ing the business cycle.
This dramatic change in monetary policy to a superior monetary-policy regime was
nevertheless not presented as a basic change of the monetary-policy framework, but
as a way of improving the performance of monetary policy in the context of the Soli-
darity Alternative.  Still, there can be no doubt that the markets fairly soon realized
that Norges Bank had in effect adopted an inflation target of about 2%, and that the
previous exchange-rate target had been abandoned.
New guidelines for economic policy
In 2000, a new challenge to the Solidarity Alternative emerged:  A dramatic increase
in the government's petroleum income triggered by the oil price increase.  In table 4.2
we see that the government's petroleum revenue (net cash flow from the petroleum
sector) increased from 4.5% of mainland GDP in 1999 to 15.3% in 2000 and to 22%
in 2001.12  The surplus of the central government increased even more, from 4% of
mainland GDP in 1999 to 15.6 in 2000 and to the astonishing 23.4% of mainland
GDP in 2001.  Likewise, the surplus on Norway’s current account increased from
6.4% in 1999 to about 20% of mainland GDP in 2000 and 2001.  The surpluses im-
plied a rapid growth of the Government Petroleum Fund from 22.1% of mainland
GDP by the end of 1999 to 55.9% two years later.  Also for the medium term future,
large current account surpluses are expected.  Although Norwegians have grown ac-
customed to such numbers, for international observers they are simply amazing.
The government's own estimates in 2000 and 2001 indicated that actual output ex-
ceeded potential output somewhat, reflecting a fairly tight labor market.  The eco-
nomic-policy framework therefore called for a relatively tight fiscal policy for 2001.
According to the cyclically adjusted non-oil budget-balance indicator mentioned
above, next to nothing of the extra oil revenues to the government could be used to
cut taxes or increase spending.  This situation exposed another weakness of the old
economic-policy framework:  It was not designed to handle a situation of full em-
ployment and large oil revenues.  In such a situation, fiscal policy would become
overloaded because the short-run goal of counter-cyclical demand management
(based on the adjusted budget indicator) would be inconsistent with the goal of phas-
ing in oil revenues and returns from the Government Petroleum Fund.  If fiscal policy
should bear the main burden of stabilizing the output gap in the short run, it could not
at the same time be used to phase in oil revenues optimally.  Norway could risk over-
accumulating government and national wealth! It became clear that fiscal policy could
                                                
12 In 2001, the share of mainland GDP in total GDP was 75%.
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not bear the sole responsibility for stabilizing the output gap.  Monetary policy had to
be given a more important stabilization role than what the old policy framework had
assigned to it.  This dilemma for Norwegian economic policy explains why the gov-
ernment changed the economic policy framework in March 2001.
Table 4.2.  Petroleum revenue, central government surplus, current account surplus,
and the Petroleum Fund, 1999-2001 (% of mainland GDP)
1999 2000 2001
Net cash flow from petroleum ac-
tivities to the government (%)
Central government surplus, incl. the
Petroleum Fund (%)
Current account surplus (%)
Capital in the Government Petro-
leum Fund (end of year) (%)
4.5
4.0
6.4
22.1
15.3
15.6
19.9
36.7
22.0
23.4
20.3
55.9
Source:  Revised national budget 2002 and Statistics Norway.
The new guidelines for economic policy presented by the (minority) labor govern-
ment to the Parliament in the Stortingsmelding No. 29, March 2001, involved two
major changes in the economic policy framework:
(1) Fiscal policy should facilitate a cautious and gradual phase-in of oil revenues ac-
cumulated in the Government Petroleum Fund, based on a new fiscal-policy rule.
According to this rule, under normal business-cycle conditions, the phase-in of oil
revenues in terms of tax cuts and spending increases should correspond to the ex-
pected annual real return from the Petroleum Fund estimated at 4%.  In addition,
however, “emphasis must still be given to stabilize economic fluctuations.”
(2) As discussed in section 3.3 above, monetary policy should be oriented towards
low and stable inflation, with an inflation target of 2.5%.  At the same time,
monetary policy should “support fiscal policy by contributing to stabilizing output
and employment.”
Confusingly, as discussed in section 3.3, the guidelines for monetary policy also
stated that monetary policy should stabilize both inflation and the exchange rate, as
well as contribute to stable expectations about future exchange rates.  Furthermore,
“[t]he new guidelines for monetary policy, together with the [new] guidelines for fis-
cal policy…, will provide a good basis for continued stability in the exchange rate,
low inflation and a stable development of output and employment.”
Indeed, as we have already seen in sections 2 and 3 above, the implied future fiscal
expansion in the new economic policy means that these three objectives are irrecon-
cilable:  Stability in the exchange rate cannot be reconciled with low inflation and a
stable output gap.
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The government also stressed its commitment to continue the incomes-policy coop-
eration with the labor market organizations.  In fact, the Stortingsmelding presents the
new policy framework as a way of attaining the goals of the Solidarity Alternative:
Work for all, a stable development of production and employment, low inflation, a
stable exchange rate, and a strong tradable-goods sector (the sector exposed to foreign
competition, in addition to the large petroleum sector).
The Stortingsmelding also gave a strong signal that fiscal policy was supposed to bear
a main responsibility for macroeconomic stabilization.  Monetary policy should only
“to some extent” support fiscal policy, and one should be careful not to place too
much burdens on monetary policy.  Less attention was paid to the corresponding
problem of overloading fiscal policy with short-term demand management tasks in
booms, when fiscal policy should also phase in petroleum revenues in a gradual man-
ner.  As explained in more detail in the next section, this probably puts unrealistically
high demands on fiscal policy.
A large majority in the Parliament supported the labor minority government’s new
guidelines for economic policy presented in the Stortingsmelding.  In the fall of 2001,
a new centre-right minority government came to power.  It immediately announced its
commitment to follow the new guidelines of economic policy stated by the previous
government.  It is noteworthy, however, that the new government signaled a change in
the role of monetary and fiscal policy:  Monetary policy should play a more important
stabilization role, and the main focus of fiscal policy should be long-run goals such as
increased potential output and a limit on the rate of growth of public spending.  This
assignment of responsibilities between monetary and fiscal policy is similar to the
practice in most other inflation targeting countries.
The importance of a credible fiscal-policy rule
The new guidelines for fiscal policy have been in operation for a little more than a
year, and it is too early to say how fiscal policy will work.  Although a large majority
in Parliament backs the main element of the fiscal-policy rule, it could come under
pressure and be changed in the future.  It is outside the scope of this report to evaluate
the fiscal policy rule itself.  We wish to emphasize, however, that Norway’s situation
makes it particularly important that there is a commitment to credible rule for fiscal
policy that prevents opportunistic overbidding behavior among competing political
parties and a loss of fiscal discipline.  Without a fiscal rule that provides strong incen-
tives for fiscal discipline, the Norwegian economy runs a large risk of decline and in-
stability under the burden of an excessive and inefficient public sector, as well as in-
sufficient investment and productivity in the private sector.  Excessive fiscal expan-
sion would create dangerously high tensions in Norway and make monetary policy
extremely difficult.  Most likely, the future fiscal expansion already implied by the
fiscal-policy rule represents a considerable challenge to Norges Bank.
The limits of discretionary fiscal policy
As noted above, the stabilization role of fiscal policy is an unresolved issue in Nor-
way.  There are well-known severe problems associated with any discretionary use of
fiscal policy for stabilizing the business cycle.  First, there are numerous lags that al-
most always make fiscal-policy packages arrive too late.  There are lags due to the
collection of data and the inherent uncertainty in identifying the phase of the business
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cycle.  There are lags in formulating the appropriate fiscal-policy response, and there
are lags in the passing of fiscal-policy packages in Parliament, in particular for a weak
government.  Once a bill has passed, there are also lags in the implementation of ex-
penditure adjustments or tax changes.  As a result, it is quite common that fiscal
stimulus arrives when the recession is over and a boom has started, and vice versa.
Thus, discretionary fiscal policy easily becomes procyclical and destabilizing.  Sec-
ond, it is very likely that a focus on short-term stabilization goals will reduce the ef-
fectiveness of fiscal policy in attaining long-term goals.  In most countries, it is politi-
cally much easier to obtain a majority vote for cutting taxes and increasing spending
in business cycle downturns than to agree on spending cuts and tax hikes in booms.
Therefore, there is easily an expansionary bias in discretionary fiscal policy, leading
to a higher real interest rate, a stronger currency and lower aggregate saving and in-
vestment.  This line of argument seems to fit the experience in many OECD countries
in the 1960s and 1970s.  Third, discretionary fiscal policy involves welfare costs.  Tax
rates become less predictable, the quality and availability of public services will fluc-
tuate with the business cycle, and the disruption of large public investment projects
will be costly.
Policy-coordination failure is another potentially serious problem with active fiscal
policy.  There could be different opinions about the equilibrium rate of unemployment
and the current output gap between the government and the central bank.  Suppose,
for example, that the central bank believes that the current output gap is positive (that
is, there is excess aggregate demand) while the government believe that the output
gap is zero.  If fiscal policy is assigned a main responsibility for short-run stabiliza-
tion, a coordination problem could arise.  If the central bank tightens monetary policy
in order to prevent increasing inflation, the government could think that fiscal loos-
ening is appropriate.  But then the central bank could react to undo the effects of the
fiscal policy, and so on.  This process would lead to a very unfortunate policy mix:
Too expansionary fiscal policy and a very tight monetary policy.
In general, good coordination of monetary and fiscal policy can be achieved by plac-
ing each within a decision framework focusing each on medium-term objectives and
making those objectives and related actions transparent.  In this way, fiscal actions
can take full account of the likely monetary-policy response, and vice versa.  Regular
information exchange between fiscal and monetary authorities will also contribute to
this.  The alternative approach to coordination, namely to make fiscal and monetary-
policy decisions jointly, is fraught with difficulties and is not feasible, given the op-
erational independence of the central bank that both in practice and in theory is neces-
sary for good monetary policy.
For these reasons, many countries have gradually scaled back discretionary fiscal
policy, given more long-term goals to fiscal policy, and let any stabilization by fiscal
policy be done by the automatic stabilizers that are built into today’s welfare states,
like unemployment benefits and income transfers.  For an ambitious welfare state like
Norway, the stabilizing effects of the automatic stabilizers are likely to be substantial.
Furthermore, as discussed in section 2, a monetary policy characterized by flexible
inflation targeting is well designed to stabilize the real economy to some extent.
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Lessons for Norwegian economic policy and challenges for monetary policy
As far as we can see, the original guidelines for fiscal policy are too optimistic about
the role of fiscal policy in stabilizing the economy.  The new government’s emphasis
on more long-term goals for fiscal policy and reliance on automatic stabilizers rather
than discretionary stabilization are therefore welcome.  It remains, however, to see
whether this government and the Norwegian political system in general can succeed
in limiting the discretionary element of fiscal policy.
Regarding the long-term goals of fiscal policy and the new fiscal-policy rule, the
phase-in of the oil revenues implies a substantial future fiscal expansion.  Furthe r-
more, there is a sizeable risk that discretionary temptations may result in much more
fiscal expansion than the rule is supposed to allow.
As discussed in section 2.4, a permanent future fiscal expansion is likely to lead to a
long-term real appreciation of the krone, an even larger short- and medium-term real
appreciation, and an increase in the neutral real interest rate.  Furthermore, these ad-
justments are equilibrium adjustment to the underlying change in long-term fiscal
policy.  As we emphasized in section 2.4, this adjustment cannot be prevented by
monetary policy.  At most, the adjustment can be delayed somewhat, but delaying the
adjustment comes with substantial costs in the form of higher variability of inflation
and the output gap and is therefore not advisable.
The confusing and mistaken rhetoric about exchange-rate stability in the new guide-
lines for economic policy seems designed to mislead the Norwegian general public
about the economic realities that the new fiscal policy implies.  It induces the misun-
derstanding that the new fiscal policy is consistent with exchange-rate stability.  Nor-
ges Bank faces a stiff challenge in implementing its monetary policy in the current
situation of a boom and real appreciation of the krone.  This challenge is made much
more difficult, if there is a misunderstanding among the Norwegian public, and per-
haps even in the Norwegian government, about the economic realities that Norway
faces.  In the rest of this report, we shall examine how Norges Bank handles these
challenges.
5  How Norges Bank conducts monetary policy
5.1  The current best international practice in inflation targeting
As discussed above in section 2, changes in the central bank's instrument rate affect
inflation and output with a lag, usually about one year for output and about two years
for inflation.  Monetary policy that aims at controlling inflation is therefore best con-
ducted in a forward-looking manner.  In principle, this is done by constructing cond i-
tional forecasts (projections) of future inflation, conditional on the available informa-
tion about the current state of the economy, the central bank's view of the transmis-
sion mechanism, and alternative levels or paths of the central bank's instrument rate
(in Norway, Norges Bank’s overnight deposit rate).  The current instrument rate is
then set so that the corresponding inflation projection is consistent with the inflation
target at an appropriate horizon, usually about two years ahead.
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Judging whether the inflation projection is consistent with the inflation target requires
that the interpretation of the inflation target is clear.  As discussed above, inflation-
targeting central banks interpret their inflation targets as flexible medium-term point
targets, aiming at achieving their inflation targets in the medium term, but also putting
some weight on stabilizing the output gap.
In principle, flexible inflation targeting can be implemented by making projections of
both inflation and the output gap and then choosing an instrument rate (or a planned
instrument rate path) that results in a good compromise between the speed with which
the inflation projection approaches the inflation target and the projected output-gap
movements required for this.  Some analysis (see, for instance, Batini and Haldane
(1999) and Svensson (1999)) has pointed out that, in many circumstance, a close to
equivalent way of incorporating flexible inflation targeting is by aiming at the infla-
tion target at a longer horizon.  This normally implies conducting policy in a more
gradual and measured way, for instance, accepting short-run (“first-round”) deviations
of inflation from the target after a shock, and this way avoiding destabilizing output.
While not perfectly equivalent, this approach is the one adopted by inflation-targeting
central banks to date, including Norges Bank.13
Which central banks in the rest of the world represent the best international practice in
inflation targeting? In our view, in Europe, the Bank of England and the Riksbank are
obvious candidates.  By now, both central banks have accumulated considerable expe-
rience in inflation targeting.  They have developed efficient procedures for informa-
tion collection, analysis and decision-making.  They are both very transparent and
thus open to scrutiny and evaluation.  They have explicitly committed themselves to
flexible rather than strict inflation targeting.  They have excellent Inflation Reports
with published forecasts and have provided regular innovations with regard to both
techniques and transparency.  Both banks publish the minutes and votes of their deci-
sion-making bodies (the MPC for the Bank of England, the Executive Board for the
Riksbank).  Those minutes reveal that the analysis and discussion before the decisions
are sophisticated and of very high quality.  Most or all members of their decision-
making bodies are experts in monetary policy, macroeconomics or financial mar-
kets.14
Beyond Europe, in line with the conclusion in Svensson (2001), we also consider the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand as providing an example of best international practice
in inflation targeting.  The Bank of Canada and the Reserve Bank of Australia may
also seem to be natural candidates.  There is no reason to doubt the competence,
judgment and accumulated experience of these banks.  However, they have so far
chosen to be less transparent than the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of
England and the Riksbank.  They have less informative and detailed reports and moti-
vations of their policy, and they do not publish minutes of their policy discussions.
                                                
13 For an example of the practical handling of these issues, see the clarification of the Executive Board
of the Riksbank in Sveriges Riksbank (1999), as well as the discussion in Heikensten and Vredin
(1998).
14 The Bank of England and the Riksbank also seem to have been models for the inflation-targeting
frameworks set up by the Czech National Bank in the transition economy of the Czech Republic and
Banco Central do Brasil in the developing economy of Brazil.
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Thus, nonpublic inside information would be required for a more thorough assessment
of the quality of their policy-making. 15
The Federal Reserve System in the US or the Eurosystem in Europe are not suitable
for comparison, since they operate in very large economies and hence under very dif-
ferent circumstances.  Furthermore, the Federal Reserve System is hardly an example
of the current best practice in inflation targeting.  Although the actual policy has been
quite successful, the monetary-policy framework lacks a clear objective and suffers
from insufficient transparency. 16
Neither is the Eurosystem (consisting of the European Central Bank and the 12 na-
tional central banks in the EMU) an example of the current best practice in inflation
targeting.  It has been severely criticized for an ambiguous and asymmetric formula-
tion of its inflation target, an inconsistent and confusing two-pillar monetary-policy
strategy, and insufficient transparency by a number of external observers.17
Thus, we find that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of England and the
Riksbank are suitable for comparison with Norges Bank as examples of the current
best international practice of inflation targeting, also since they operate in open and
not too large economies.
5.2  Evaluating inflation targeting
As noted above in section 3.3, the Regulation for Monetary Policy of March 2001
specifies that monetary policy “shall be oriented towards low and stable inflation,”
and that “the operational target of monetary policy shall be annual consumer price
inflation of approximately 2.5 per cent over time.” Furthermore, “[a]t the same time,
monetary policy shall underpin fiscal policy by contributing to stable developments in
output and employment.”  As discussed above, it makes sense to interpret the last
sentence as referring to stability of the output gap, the difference between output and
potential output (which in most cases would be highly correlated with the difference
between employment and “potential” employment).  In addition, “[i]n general, the
direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in interest rates, taxes, excise
duties and extraordinary temporary disturbances shall not be taken into account.”
This regulation thus specifies flexible inflation targeting, with a 2.5% inflation target
for a modified consumer price index (CPI) that excludes some direct effects on the
                                                
15 The Reserve Bank of Australia is however similar to Norges Bank in that monetary-policy decisions
are made by an Executive Board with several members who are nonexperts in monetary policy and
related issues.
16 The guiding legislation (the Federal Reserve Bank Act) arguably lists contradictory goals for the
Federal Reserve System, and any move towards a more consistent law about the goals of monetary
policy seems stalled. Members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) are sometimes re-
ported to have different objectives and different perceived models of the economy. Published monetary
policy statements are not of the same quality and transparency as those of the inflation-targeting central
banks. Several informed observers have suggested that the Federal Reserve System should move to an
explicit inflation-targeting regime (Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1998), Bernanke, Laubach
and Posen (2000) and Cecchetti (2000).
17 See, for example, Gros, Blanchard, Emerson, Mayer, Sinn, St. Paul and Tabellini (1998), Favero,
Freixas, Persson and Wyplosz (2000) and Svensson (2000).
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CPI.  Norges Bank used a CPI adjusted for changes in taxes and energy prices, de-
noted by the acronym CPIATE.
One way to evaluate the performance of Norges Bank would be to examine whether
actual CPIATE inflation has stayed close to the inflation target and whether monetary
policy has contributed to stable developments in the output gap.  There are two prob-
lems with such an approach.  The first, temporary, problem is that the new guidelines
for monetary policy only started to apply in March 2001.  Above we have emphasized
the lags between instrument adjustment and effect on output and inflation, perhaps a
year for output and up to another year for inflation.  Thus, the decisions Norges Bank
have made in the first year after the introduction of the new guidelines have not yet
had their full impact on output, much less on inflation.  We need at least another year
or two of data to include the period during which the first year’s decisions have had
their impact on output and inflation, and several years of data to be able to assess
some average performance.  The second, more fundamental, problem is that monetary
policy is conducted under considerable—sometimes close to overwhelming—uncer-
tainty, given difficulties in interpreting incoming information, assessing the state of
the economy and uncertainty about the lags and effects of monetary-policy actions on
the future development of the economy.  Also, during the lags between instrument
adjustment and impact on output and inflation, unanticipated shocks and disturbances
intervene, so the observations of actual output and inflation are contaminated by these
shocks.  Furthermore, potential output, the reference point for output used to construct
the output gap, is notoriously difficult to estimate.  Thus, ex post evaluation of mone-
tary policy is not as easy to do as one might first think, even if several years of data is
available, and unless adjustment for unanticipated shocks is done, it may be quite
misleading.  In general, with the benefit of hindsight, monetary policy could in most
cases have been better.  This is not surprising.  The real issue, however, is whether
there were any serious mistakes, given available information at the time of decision.
Thus, because of these two problems, evaluation of monetary policy during the first
year of the new guidelines must be ex ante.  Given the available information about the
state of the economy and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy at the time
of decisions, did Norges Bank make the right decisions?  As discussed above, best-
international-practice inflation-targeting central banks like the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand, the Bank of England and the Riksbank in practice implement inflation tar-
geting by setting interest rates such that the corresponding inflation forecast is con-
sistent with the inflation target at a reasonable horizon, usually about two years.  This
is also the way Norges Bank implements inflation targeting.
Then, the projections provide the way to evaluate policy.  A first question is, are the
forecasts Norges Bank uses in its implementation reasonably good and unbiased?  A
second question is, given the projections, in particular the inflation projections, did
Norges Bank make the right decisions?
Concerning the first question, we have not been able to independently examine the
quality of Norges Bank’s forecasts.  Sturød (2002) evaluates Norges Bank’s forecasts
for 2000 for a number of macro variables and compares them with those of a few
other forecasters, namely the OECD, Consensus Economics, the IMF and the Ministry
of Finance.  Norges Bank has the best forecast of inflation and does not have the
worst forecast for GDP.  A more extensive study over a longer sample is necessary for
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a precise conclusion, but we nevertheless proceed under the assumption that Norges
Bank’s forecasts are as good as other forecasters’ and in that sense reasonably good
and unbiased.
This leaves the second question, whether, given the projections, Norges Bank made
the right decisions.
5.3  The big picture
Above, we have outlined the challenges Norges Bank faces.  In evaluating the per-
formance of Norges Bank, we start with the big picture.  By this we mean whether the
Bank has an appropriate decision process for monetary policy, whether its analysis is
of sufficient quality, and whether the Bank has the major insights that make it likely
that individual decisions are right.
The decision process of monetary policy18
The Executive Board makes the decisions about the instrument rate.  The Bank has
developed an elaborate decision process, where large amounts of data and information
are collected, processed and analyzed in a regular decision cycle.  The analysis is
summarized in the Bank’s Inflation Report, which is published three times a year.19
The Inflation Report presents an in-depth analysis of the state of the Norwegian econ-
omy and the outlook for inflation.  The Inflation Report is published, together with a
decision about the instrument rate, immediately after a monetary-policy meeting with
the Executive Board.20
The Executive Board discusses the economic outlook at a separate meeting, the so-
called strategy meeting, three weeks before the Inflation Report is published.  On the
basis of preliminary projections and analysis, the Executive Board assesses the out-
look for inflation some two years ahead, as well as the uncertainty surrounding the
projections.  The next day, the Executive Board summarizes its discussions and as-
sesses the consequences for monetary policy for the next four months.  This assess-
ment, contained in the Strategeginotat (Note on Strategy), constitutes an important
internal reference point when the Executive Board later makes a decision regarding
the interest rate.  It will also provide a basis for the Bank’s externally oriented com-
munication through speeches and the media.
Two members of Norges Bank Watch (Steigum and Svensson) have had the opportu-
nity to examine the Strateginotat of the strategy meetings before the Inflation Reports
                                                
18 Gjedrem (2001b) provides more details on the decision process for monetary policy.
19 The Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of England and the Riksbank publish Inflation Reports
(called Monetary Policy Statements in New Zealand) four times a year rather than three.  As noted in
Kohn (2000), this quarterly frequency puts a lot of stress on the staff.  It may very well be that new
relevant information for monetary policy normally arrives at such a modest rate that major decisions
every four months are sufficient.
20 The Bank has invited Hans Genberg and Charles Wyplosz, Graduate Institute for International Stud-
ies, Geneva, to evaluate the Inflation Report.  The purpose of the evaluation is to assess (1) how suit-
able the Inflation Report is as a basis for monetary policy, compared to Inflation Reports in other
countries and (2) how good the report is in communicate monetary policy externally, to journalists, the
market and other agents.
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of October 2001 and February 2002.  They provide analysis of very good quality, in
content similar to the Inflation Report.  They go further than the Inflation Report, for
instance, in discussing consequences of alternative instrument-rate paths and in moti-
vation for the particular instrument-rate intervals considered.  The Strateginotat is not
published; we believe a natural further improvement of the transparency of Norwe-
gian monetary policy is that they are published.  Such publication would indeed be
very much in line with the definition of transparency as "the extent to which the ex-
ternal presentation of the decisions corresponds to the internal decision-making proc-
ess" due to Duisenberg (2000), which definition is approvingly quoted by Gjedrem
(2001a, 2002) and Bergo (2002).
The Executive Board uses a simple rule in its interest-rate decision (Gjedrem, 2001b):
“If it appears that inflation will be higher than 2½ per cent with unchanged
interest  rates, the interest rate will be increased.  If it appears that inflation will
be lower than 2½ per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will
be reduced.
… Analyses performed by Norges Bank indicate that a substantial share of the
effects on inflation occur within two years.  Two years is therefore a reason-
able time horizon for achieving the inflation target of 2½ per cent.  Therefore,
the inflation outlook in two years may be viewed as an intermediate target for
monetary policy.”
Between the publications of the Inflation Reports, the Executive Board meets for in-
depth monetary-policy discussions every six weeks, at pre-announced dates.  Then the
Board assesses developments in a number of different economic indicators, with spe-
cial emphasis on substantial deviations from the assessments in the last Inflation Re-
port.  Normally, any decisions regarding changes in interest rates are taken at these
meetings.  The Executive Board’s decision is published in a press release immediately
after monetary-policy meetings.  After each monetary-policy meeting, a press confer-
ence is held at which the Bank’s assessments are summarized and the Executive
Board’s decision is presented.
The Bank’s analysis and decisions are communicated in an efficient and transparent
way, via the Inflation Reports, press releases and the introduction to press conferences
after the Board’s monetary-policy meetings.  These are all available on the Bank’s
well-organized website.
As far as we can see, Norges Bank’s decision process and external communication is
very appropriate and comparable to best international practice.  As we shall see, this
does not prevent us from recommending a few potential further improvements of the
decision process and the Bank’s analysis and projections.
Summary assessment of the big picture
Thus, when it comes to the big picture, we believe we have a firm conclusion.  Nor-
wegian monetary policy is in very good hands.  The Bank has a very competent and
highly trained top management and staff.  The top management and many in the staff
has long experience of economic policy, both monetary and fiscal.  The Bank has a
long tradition of research and analysis on an academic level.  Although the Bank has a
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short experience of inflation targeting, for several years before inflation targeting was
introduced, it organized conferences and meetings on monetary policy, including in-
flation targeting, with academic researchers and central bank officials from many
countries, and this way building up understanding of and competence in inflation tar-
geting.  We believe the Bank’s Inflation Report, the Strateginotat, the speeches by
Bank officials and articles and working papers published by the Bank clearly demon-
strate the high quality of the Bank’s analysis and understanding.  The Bank gives the
impression of being a very competent and enthusiastic newcomer to the inflation-
targeting camp, and it is our firm view that it masters the insights required for suc-
cessful inflation targeting.  Again, this praise will not deter us from proposing a num-
ber of potential improvements, which in several cases would push the frontier of best
international practice in inflation targeting further out.
5.4  Brief evaluation of decisions
Figure 5.1 shows inflation of CPIATE for 2001-2002 and the inflation projections
from the last four Inflation Reports, of June and October in 2001 and February and
June of 2002.  Figure 5.2 shows the Bank’s instrument rate, the overnight deposit rate,
for 1999-2001.
After the current monetary-policy regime was introduced in March, 2001, Norges
Bank kept the instrument rate at 7% until December 12, 2001, when it reduced the
rate to 6.5%.  On July 3, 2002, the Bank increased the rate back to 7%.
Figure 5.1.  Inflation and inflation projections (%/yr)
Source:  Statistics Norway and Norges Bank.
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Figure 5.2.  The instrument rate (the sight deposit rate, %)
Source:  Norges Bank.
First we shall discuss some general aspects of how Norges Bank uses projections;
then we shall discuss some individual decisions.
The assumptions of constant interest rates and exchange rates
The projections Norges Bank uses and reports in the Inflation Report are constructed
under some specific assumptions.  The appendix to the Inflation Report includes a ta-
ble with the assumptions made about the most crucial variables.  The standard as-
sumptions about the instrument rate and the exchange rate are that they are constant.
This is problematic.  First, a constant exchange rate is usually not consistent with a
constant interest rate and theoretical relations like uncovered interest-rate parity.
Neither is a constant exchange rate usually consistent with market expectations of fu-
ture exchange rates.  Fortunately, the Inflation Report also includes some discussion
of the consequences of alternative exchange-rate assumptions.  Second, a constant
interest rate is usually not consistent with the best future monetary policy, the likely
future policy, or market expectations.  This means that the assumption of constant in-
strument rates builds in a number of inconsistencies in the resulting projections,
which adds a certain degree of arbitrariness to these projections.21  Furthermore, since
the assumption of a constant interest rate is usually not the best forecast of future in-
strument rates, the resulting projections of inflation, output and other variables are not
the best forecasts of future outcomes.  Thus, it makes less sense to compare actual
outcomes to constant-instrument-rate forecasts, something that any serious evaluation
of forecasts has to take into account.
                                                
21 Leitemo (1999, 2001) discusses some of the problems with constant-interest-rate forecasts.
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One argument in defense of constant-interest-rate projections is that they show what
would happen if the instrument rate is held constant and therefore often provide a
good motivation why it should be moved in a particular direction.  On the other hand,
this does not say how much the instrument rate should be moved, and how soon.
There is often a choice between a smaller adjustment sooner and a larger adjustment
later.  Which is best?  Another argument is that a monetary-policy committee would
have difficulties agreeing on something else, like a time-varying path for the instru-
ment rate.  This argument is not convincing to us, since a monetary-policy committee
is agreeing on a number of other time-varying paths, like the inflation and output
projections, for instance.  A third argument is that, if a time-varying instrument path
were announced in the Inflation Report, market participants and other agents would
be confused and interpret this as a firm commitment of future instrument-rate setting.
This argument seems defeated by the fact that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand for a
number of years has published both a time-varying instrument-rate path and inflation
and output-gap projections conditional on a time-varying instrument path, without any
apparent misunderstanding by market participants and other agents.  Indeed, Norwe-
gian market participants and other agents are already used to see inflation projections
and seem fully able to understand that these are contingent about available informa-
tion and the state of the economy, and that they will shift when new relevant informa-
tion arrives.  What is the difference between the appropriate instrument-rate path and
the inflation projection shifting when new information arrives and the state of the
economy changes?
For these reasons, it seems to us that Norges Bank should further develop its inflation
projections so as to make these conditional on time-varying instrument rate paths.
Furthermore, the monetary-policy decisions of the Bank should aim at finding a good
or even optimal future time-varying instrument-rate path.  To some extent, some of
that work is already done in the Strateginotat that the Board uses as guides between
the major four-monthly decision points.  It is just a matter of developing the process a
bit further.
The best situation would seem to be if Norges Bank at each major decision point de-
termined what its best instrument-rate plan and corresponding inflation and output-
gap projections are.  These projections would then become the Bank’s best forecasts
of these variables and be the natural ones to publish in the Inflation Report.  Publish-
ing these best forecasts would seem to have the most effective impact on private-
sector expectations and the economy, and thus be the most effective way to imple-
ment policy.
Norges Bank has already in the past presented inflation projections conditional on
market expectations of future interest rates and exchange rates, so it already knows
how to make projections conditional on time-varying paths of these variables.
A separate but related point is that, since the Strateginotat contains some essential
material that does not appear in the Inflation Report, this should be published as well,
alternatively all essential content of the Strateginotat should be added to the Inflation
Report.  However, one useful principle would be that, with few exceptions, all the
material that the Board receives before its monetary-policy decision would be pub-
lished, possibly with a lag of a few weeks.  This would adhere to principles of trans-
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parency, in particular the definition due to Duisenberg (2000) mentioned above, but
would also, by allowing external scrutiny, even further strengthen the incentives for
submitting to the Board high-level analysis that can stand the light of day.
Mean, mode and the balance of risk
Norges Bank, as Bank of England and the Riksbank, uses the mode projection (the
outcome that the Bank assesses the highest probability to) as their central projection.
Thus, whenever the Bank quotes a single number for a projection, this number is the
mode.
The graphs of the inflation projections in the Inflation Reports display both the mode
and a fan chart illustrating the Bank’s view of the probability distribution around the
mode.  Figure 5.3 shows an example, from IR 3/01, published in October 2001.  As
we can see, the mode of the inflation projection (the thick dark-blue line) falls below
2.5% until at a horizon of about two years, when the mode coincides with 2.5% until
then end of the projection, at the end of 2003.  The shaded fields of dark to light blue
illustrate the Bank’s view of the uncertainty about the projection, the probability dis-
tribution for the outcome of inflation, under the stated underlying assumptions for the
projection.  Thus, 30% of the probability distribution falls within the innermost dark-
blue shaded area, 50% falls within that area and the next lighter-blue shaded area, etc.
The lightest-blue shaded area (including the darker-shaded area) contains 90% of the
probability distribution.
Figure 5.3.  Chart 3.8 in IR 3/01.
As we can see in figure 5.3, the blue shades are not symmetric around the mode.
More of the probability mass is located below the mode than above.  This is seen
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more clearly in figure 5.4 (chart 3.9 in IR 3/01), which shows the probability density
function for inflation at the end of 2003.  The mode corresponds to the maximum
probability density and equals, in this case, 2.5%.  Figure 5.4 shows that 60% of the
probability mass falls below the mode and that 40% falls above the mode.  Thus, this
is a case of an asymmetric probability distribution.  The probability that the inflation
outcome will fall below the mode is larger than the probability that it will fall above.
Figure 5.4.  Chart 3.9 in IR 3/01.
Norges Bank takes account of such asymmetries in bias statements like
“according to Norges Bank’s assessment, with an unchanged interest rate, the
probability that inflation two years ahead will be lower (higher) than 2.5% is
greater than/is the same as the probability that it will be higher (lower)”.
Thus, the bias is up/neutral/down means that the probability that inflation two years
ahead will be above 2.5% is higher/the same/lower than the probability that it will be
lower than 2.5%.  Furthermore, the Bank tends to adjust the instrument rate in the
same direction as the bias.
The bias statement is actually a statement about the median projection, since the me-
dian is the outcome with the same probability above and below the outcome.  Thus,
the bias is up/neutral/down means that the median inflation two-year ahead is
above/equal to/below 2.5%.  Consequently, the Bank tends to adjust the instrument
rate in the opposite direction when the median inflation projection two years ahead
deviates from the inflation target.
If this is so, would it not be simpler and more transparent to use the median as the
central projection?  That is, let the thick blue line in figure 5.3 be the median rather
than the mode.  Then the extra formulation about the probabilities is unnecessary, and
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the fan chart is only used to illustrate the degree of uncertainty, not to adjust the fore-
cast from the mean.
However, the theory says that the mean, the probability weighted average, is the right
central projection.  This is because of so-called certainty equivalence.  That is, if the
transmission mechanism is approximately linear and the objectives can be expressed
as an approximately quadratic loss function, optimal monetary policy can be ex-
pressed in terms of the mean projections.  Put differently, once the mean projections
have been constructed, the analysis can proceed as if there were no uncertainty about
the mean.  The theoretical result about certainty equivalence is one of the most power-
ful and important results for practical monetary policy. 22
Thus, this suggests that Norges Bank should compute the mean projection and report
that as their central projection.  Then the fan chart can be used to illustrate the degree
of uncertainty in the projections, but no additional adjustment because of asymmetric
probability distributions needs to be done.  This seems a much simpler and more
transparent procedure than the current reporting of mode forecast and subsequent ad-
justment when the mean forecast differ from the mode.
Norges Bank is not alone in using mode projections; central banks have a tradition to
report mode forecasts rather than mean forecasts.  The reason is probably that in the
construction of informal and judgmental projections, the practice of forecasters is of-
ten to discuss the most likely outcome first.  The fact that projections often are con-
structed by starting from the mode does not, however, imply that they have to be re-
ported as mode forecasts.  Since Norges Bank also constructs a probability distribu-
tion around the mode, it is trivial to construct the mean projection from the probability
distribution.  Thus, the practice to start with mode projection does not imply that one
cannot report the mean projection as the central projection.
Moving from two-year inflation projections to both inflation and output-gap
projections
As discussed, Norges Bank implements flexible inflation targeting by referring to in-
flation projections about two years ahead.  As discussed in section 2, this is an im-
plicit way to achieve a good compromise between inflation stability and output-gap
stability.  It has become the standard way to implement flexible inflation targeting
among best-international-practice inflation targeting central banks.  Still, it is an ap-
proximate and implicit way to implement flexible inflation targeting, and theory has
shown that it may be somewhat more imperfect than was first thought (see, for in-
stance, Leitemo (1999, 2001)).  Therefore, we believe that Norges Bank could further
develop flexible inflation targeting by constructing and publishing output-gap projec-
tions parallel to the inflation projections, and then choose a time-varying instrument-
rate path that achieves a good compromise between inflation stability and output sta-
bility.  This would elevate flexible inflation targeting to a new level of sophistication
and could mean that Norges Bank on this point takes the lead in the world-wide de-
velopment of inflation targeting.
                                                
22 Svensson and Woodford (2002) discuss the certainty-equivalence theorem in a fairly general situa-
tion when there are forward-looking variables and partial information about the state of the economy.
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An explicit weight on output-gap stability
Another step towards more explicit flexible inflation targeting would be to be more
explicit about the weight on output-gap stability.  Indeed, as discussed in section 2,
since flexible inflation targeting, implies a delicate choice between inflation and out-
put-gap variability, transparency would seem to be well served if inflation-targeting
central banks became more explicit about this choice and their preferences between
inflation and output stability.  Svensson (2002a, b) has argued that central bank’s
should come out in the open and be explicit about their relative preferences between
inflation and output-gap stability by deciding on and announcing the weight they put
on stability of the output gap relative to stability of inflation.  Norges Bank, with its
devotion to transparency, could take the lead here and be the first to announce this
relative weight.  An intermediate step would be to make an internal preliminary deci-
sion about the relative weight and see to what extent that would be useful in policy
decisions.
Norges Banks decisions from September 2001
We also discuss some individual decisions of Norges Bank since the publication of
the last Norges Bank Watch in September 2001.  Naturally, we have more to say on
the principles for decisions and instrument-rate setting and somewhat less to say on
the actual interest-rate levels chosen, since we have not had the time and resources for
a thorough evaluation of each decision.
As noted above, the Board of Norges Bank conducts monetary-policy meetings about
every six weeks.  The first meeting after the last Norges Bank Watch was published in
September 2001 was held on September 19, 2001.  The potential consequences of the
events of September 11 had presented central banks all over the world with a new
challenge and increased uncertainty.  In the aftermath of the events of September 11,
central banks across Europe had conducted cuts in the short-term interest rates.  In
contrast, Norges Bank kept the instrument rate unchanged at 7%.  The press release
stated that the bias was neutral, that is (cf. discussion above), that the median inflation
projection two years ahead was on target.  This was the same statement as after the
previous monetary-policy meeting on August 8.  Thus, the inflation projection two-
years out had not changed after September 11.
The interest-rate decision was somewhat controversial and took the market by sur-
prise.  The real uncertainty at this point was about international factors and their im-
pact on the Norwegian economy.
The Board stated in its decision (Introduction to the press conference, September 19,
2001):
“The Norwegian economy is characterized by high capacity utilization and high
cost inflation.  The mainland economy appears to be expanding approximately in
line with growth in output potential.  At present, we do not have sufficient evi-
dence to assert that international developments will change this situation as long
as oil prices remain high.  House prices and household borrowing are rising at a
rapid pace.  The announced increase in spending of petroleum revenues could
lead to a more expansionary fiscal stance than in recent years.”
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Thus, the Bank’s view was that activity and demand remained high and that there was
not yet sufficient evidence that international developments would change this and af-
fect the inflation projections, which would make wait and see the appropriate policy.
We have not had the time and resources to scrutinize this view and decision in further
detail, nor to look more into the issue of how sensitive the Norwegian economy is to
international disturbances that affect export demand and export prices separately from
the effect through oil prices and the exchange rate.
In the 10 days after September 11, the oil price dropped from around USD 28 per bar-
rel to USD 21, while the krone remained basically unchanged (see figures 5.5 and
5.6).  Moreover, the Norwegian stock market followed global equity markets into
nose dive of more than 30 percent.  Clearly, the Bank faced a difficult situation.
Figure 5.5.  The oil price (Brent blend, $/barrel)
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From an ex post point of view, the Bank’s decision on September 19 to keep the in-
strument rate unchanged at 7% appears to be the right one.  The recession feared by
many in the days after September 11 did not materialize, perhaps to a large extent be-
cause of the easing of monetary policy by other central banks.
The (unpublished) Strateginotat of October 4 (which has been read by Steigum and
Svensson) and the subsequent Inflation Report of October, 2001, present, in our view,
a competent and cool-headed analysis of this difficult situation with a focus on me-
dium-term fundamentals.
The mode inflation projection presented in the Inflation Report is shown in figure 5.1
(the curve for IR 3/01) and figures 5.3-5.4.  Although, the mode projection two-years
ahead was on target, the bias was down, as stated in the bias statement of October 31.
According to Norges Bank’s simple rule, this could have motivated a lowered interest
rate already then, even though activity and demand remained high.
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At the next Board meeting, on December 12, the instrument rate was cut by 0.5 per-
centage points to 6.5%.  Even with the new interest rate, the bias was still down.  The
oil prices had not recovered from the September decline and still seemed to be on a
downward trend.
The next meeting was held on January 23, 2002.  The Bank kept the instrument rate
unchanged, in spite of still stating that the median inflation projection two years out
remained below target.  At this time, the risk of a deep recession in the world econ-
omy appeared to have diminished.  By early March, the oil price was back above
USD 20 per barrel.  By then, it seemed clear that there would not be an international
recession.  At the Board meeting on February 27, the bias statement was changed to
neutral.  The Bank moved the focus back to domestic issues, where uncertainty about
upcoming wage negotiations was high.  After the Board meeting on April 10, the
Bank stated that (Introduction to the press conference):
“Wage negotiations are under way, but at this stage it would be premature to
draw any conclusions about the outcome.”
At the next meeting, held on May 22, the trend in the wage agreements was con-
firmed.  The Board changed the bias to up.
Strong wage growth, faster growth in consumption, a higher oil price and a more fa-
vourable global economic outlook made the increased tensions in the Norwegian
economy in the late spring and summer of 2002.  The krone continued to appreciate,
as one would expect, both from the future fiscal expansion implied by the new guide-
lines for fiscal policy and by the general increase in demand, but, according to the
Bank’s statement, not sufficiently to counteract these tensions (Introduction to the
press conference):
“The effective krone exchange rate is now 4½ per cent stronger than the rate as-
sumed in the February Inflation Report. … [T]he appreciation of the krone cannot
fully counteract stronger wage growth, faster growth in consumption, a higher oil
price and a somewhat more favorable global economic outlook.”
In June and July 2002 the perception of economic developments in the US as well as
Europe took a negative turn.  Financial markets experienced severe turbulence, and
stock indices fell, adding to the uncertainty of the situation.
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Figure 5.6.  Effective NOK exchange rate (Chart 1, p. 8, of IR 2/02)
On July 3, Norges Bank raised the interest rate 0.5 percentage points to 7%.  The In-
flation Report of July, 2002, still showed an inflation projection conditional on an in-
strument rate of 6.5%.  The mode projection is shown in figure 5.1 (the curve for IR
2/02).  As seen in the figure, the mode projection exceeds the target two years ahead,
in July 2004.  The bias statement of July 3 was up.  The statement does not explicitly
mention whether this is conditional on a 6.5 or 7% interest rate (a slight transparency
slip).  We interpret it as conditional on 7%; if so, even after the 0.5 percentage point
increase, the median projection exceeded the target.  The Inflation Report contains a
very interesting discussion of the consequences of alternative assumptions about both
interest rates and exchange rates (including an instrument-path consistent with market
expectations of an increased instrument rate).  The Introduction to the press confe r-
ence provided further details:
“Growth in the Norwegian economy picked up towards the end of 2001 and into
2002.  Private consumption has shown a substantial rise as a result of strong in-
come growth.  Households also expect continued strong income growth in the
period ahead.  Households are still borrowing heavily.  Housing investment is
high and financial investment is low.  House prices are rising.  Public expend i-
ture is growing as a percentage of GDP.  The level of petroleum investment is
expected to be high.  Large projects in the aluminum industry are boosting
mainland business investment, whereas other investment may be low.  There are
strong pressures on economic resources.  Wage growth is markedly higher than
estimated in the February Inflation Report.  The results of the various pay set-
tlements point to wage growth of between 5½ per cent and 6 per cent this year.
This year’s wage settlements resulted in different pay increases for different
groups … These developments may easily trigger and amplify wage-wage spi-
rals.  Persistently high wage growth is contributing to a high rise in prices for
domestically produced goods and services. …
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There is uncertainty as to developments in many of the factors that will influ-
ence inflation in the period ahead.  This also applies to the krone exchange rate.
Relationships in the foreign exchange market are unstable.  Our projections for
inflation are based on the assumption of a krone exchange rate equal to the av-
erage for the second quarter.  The krone is now stronger than this.  A persis-
tently strong krone will have a dampening impact on inflation compared with
the projections we have presented.”
Given the strong inflationary pressure referred to in the July 3 decision, it would
probably have been reasonable to assume a new instrument rate increase on the next
meeting, August 7.  However, the Board chose to keep the rates stable, although the
bias was still up.
Throughout July and August, data for the Norwegian economy indicated a softening
of domestic demand.  Seasonally adjusted goods consumption decelerated, industrial
activity remained weak, and unemployment picked up.  Moreover, the Prime Minister
signaled that the National Budget, due on October 3, would imply a tight policy
stance in order to prevent excessive stimulus to the economy.  In line with this, the
term structure of interest rates indicates an expected fall in the instrument rate.
At the Board meeting on September 18, the instrument rate was left unchanged and
bias was changed to neutral.
5.5  Market anticipation of interest-rate decisions and market communi-
cation
The so-called surprise factor, the shift in market interest rate due to interest-rate deci-
sions by the central bank, has been larger in Norway compared with other inflation
targeting countries (Bernhardsen and Kloster (2002)).  Such a shift indicates that the
market had not fully anticipated the interest-rate decisions (see figure 5.7 for the
change in the one-month interest rate after monetary-policy meetings).  The impact on
Norwegian short term interest rates has been somewhat stronger than a broad interna-
tional average for the 1990s.  The Bank suggests that one reason for this may be that
Norway’s inflation target is recent, and that it takes time for market participants and
Norges Bank to gain experience with regard to response patterns and communication.
Another possible reason is that the instrument rate has been adjusted by a half per-
centage point in Norway, while other central banks with lower interest rates have
more frequently changed key rates by a quarter percentage point.  Furthermore, the
inflation-targeting regime is new and both market participants and the Bank may need
more experience in order to increase the predictability of interest-rate decisions.
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Figure 5.7.  Changes in the one-month rate after monetary-policy meetings
Increased predictability of monetary policy is desirable because it makes the imple-
mentation of monetary policy more effective and reduces volatility in the market.  Of
course, this does not mean that the Bank should set the interest rate so as to fulfill
market expectations.  As noted by Gjedrem (2002):  “If a central bank always acts in
line with market expectations, there would no longer be an objective anchor for finan-
cial market expectations.”
We are confident that some of our recommended improvements would reduce the
surprise factor and make interest-rate decisions more predictable.  Our recommenda-
tion to announce the Bank’s best projection of its future instrument-rate path would
contribute to this.  This will guide the market both with respect to timing and levels of
the changes in interest rates and further improve the effect of monetary policy through
the term structure of interest rates.  Publishing the Strateginotat will give further de-
tails into the Bank’s analysis and plans.  Finally, we note with approval the effort the
Bank is already making in arranging regular meetings with market participants with
discussions of the conduct of monetary policy.
5.6  Potential improvements to the conduct of monetary policy
Although we believe Norges Bank is already conducting inflation targeting according
to best international practice, we nevertheless see a number of instances where its way
of conducting monetary policy could be improved.  These instances would in several
cases involve pushing the frontier of best international practice further out:
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· Inflation projections should generally be done conditional on the Bank’s preferred
instrument-rate path; that is, conditional on its best forecast of its future instru-
ment-rate settings.  This would normally be a time-varying instrument-rate path.
The assumed exchange-rate path should also normally be the Bank’s best forecast
of the future exchange rate, also normally a time-variable path.  This would avoid
some problems and inconsistencies associated with the current standard assump-
tion of constant interest and exchange rates.  It may also make monetary policy
more predictable and improve the Bank’s communication with the market.
· The central projections should be the mean projections (the probability-weighted
average outcome) rather than mode projections (the most likely outcome).  This is
in line with established economic theory, which says that it is the mean forecast
rather than the mode forecast that is relevant for decisions.  This would normally
make the somewhat cumbersome adjustment of the mode projection to the balance
of risk unnecessary, and the fan charts for the projections would mainly be used to
illustrate the uncertainty of the projections.
· The Bank should construct and publish projections of potential output, actual out-
put and hence the output gap, conditional on time-variable instrument-rate paths.
In this way the Bank can better reach the most desirable compromise between in-
flation variability and output-gap variability and the resulting compromise will be
more open to external scrutiny.
· The emphasis on the precise two-year horizon of inflation projections on target
should be reduced.  Instead, the Bank should find the projections of inflation, the
output gap and the corresponding instrument-rate path that the Bank thinks would
achieve the best compromise between inflation stability and output-gap stability.
These projections should be published in the Inflation Report and the Bank should
set its instrument rate accordingly.  These projections will then be the Bank’s best
unconditional forecast of future inflation, output gap and instrument rate.  Pub-
lishing them will maximize the impact on private-sector expectations and thereby
implement monetary policy more effectively.  Publishing them also opens the
Bank’s projections for more precise external scrutiny.  The fan charts around the
projections should be constructed and interpreted as the Bank’s best unconditional
estimate of the uncertainty in the projections, thus conditional on its own future
policy response.
· The Bank’s analysis and explanations might benefit from further use of the con-
cepts of potential output, output gap and neutral real interest rate.
· The Bank could be more explicit about the weight it puts on output-gap stability
relative to inflation stability.
6  The debate on monetary policy and the currency appre-
ciation
6.1  The debate on currency appreciation
The krone has now appreciated significantly against most other currencies (see figure
5.6).  This is a matter of considerable concern in the traded-goods sector, because it
adds to an already high cost level.  On average, Norwegian companies have lost some
15% of their competitive power over the last two years.
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As discussed in section 2.4, a real appreciation of the currency is what should be ex-
pected under a fiscal expansion.  More precisely, the new guidelines for fiscal policy
imply a permanent future fiscal expansion.  This is likely to be accompanied by not
only a permanent real appreciation of the krone but an even stronger real appreciation
in the short and medium term and a higher neutral real interest rate.  These adjust-
ments are equilibrium adjustments of the real economy to the new fiscal policy.  Thus,
they are independent of monetary policy, and cannot be prevented by monetary pol-
icy.  Monetary policy might delay the real appreciation somewhat, by focusing on
stabilizing the nominal exchange rate instead of inflation and the output gap.  Perhaps
such monetary policy could delay the real appreciation a few quarters or perhaps a
year or so.  Such a monetary policy, by being in the short run more expansionary than
current policy by Norges Bank, would in the present situation most likely lead to
rapidly increasing inflation and an overheated economy.  The real appreciation in-
duced by fiscal policy would then arise through an increase in the price level.  As dis-
cussed above, historically such policies, because of the inherent inertia in inflation
once it has taken off, have lead to an over-appreciation and hence overvaluation of the
currency, after which the boom often has turned to bust.
As far as we can see, in the current situation with a zero or positive output gap and
considerable inflationary pressure, Norges Bank is conducting inflation targeting ac-
cording to best international practice in its effort to trying to keep the two-year-ahead
inflation projection on target.  This requires a relatively high real interest rate, but this
is not strange since the neutral real interest rate is likely to be higher, because of the
future fiscal expansion and related current growth in consumption and demand.  Ar-
guably, a good measure of the tightness of monetary policy is not the short real inter-
est rate (the instrument rate less actual inflation or short term inflation expectations)
but the short real interest rate gap, the difference between the short real interest rate
and the neutral interest rate.  Then, monetary policy is actually less tight than one
might at first think.
The current public debate about the real appreciation and monetary policy seems quite
confused.  Several recent debaters do not seem to understand the relation between the
real appreciation and fiscal policy and the limitations of monetary policy.  Several
participants in the debate have complained about the strong krone and its conse-
quences, explicitly or implicitly blaming Norges Bank’s for contributing to this by its
instrument-rate increase in July, 2002, and its focus on stabilizing inflation, without in
our view a proper analysis of the reasons for the appreciation.
As noted above in section 3, the government’s guidelines for monetary policy are also
confusing and even inconsistent on this point, and the reference to stability of the ex-
change rate should be deleted from the guidelines.
Arguably, the Bank’s motivation for the de facto inflation target from 1999 may have
contributed to the confusion.  There, inflation equal to that in Europe was motivated
as a way to achieve long-run stability in the exchange rate.  This argument relies on
long-term purchasing-power parity, that is, that the long-term real exchange rate is
stable.  However, in an oil economy where oil revenues sooner or later will be phased
in, long-term purchasing power need not hold.  Indeed, as argued in section 2.4, a
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permanent fiscal expansion may imply a permanent real appreciation of the cur-
rency. 23
Is the Bank currently explaining these insights in the best way?  In its letter of March
2001 to the Ministry of Finance regarding the new guidelines for monetary policy
(Norges Bank, 2001), the Bank states:
“Norges Bank would assert that a gradual phasing in of petroleum revenues
approximately in step with the expected real return of the Petroleum Fund
will, ceteris paribus, contribute to deteriorating conditions for businesses ex-
posed to international competition [the tradable-goods sector].”
This sentence would perhaps be even clearer if it was followed by a statement that the
main mechanism through which the tradable-goods sector is shrunk is through a real
appreciation of the currency, and that this is a real adjustment that is not due to
monetary policy.
The Inflation Report of June 2002 contains a box on p. 8-10 with the title “Why Has
the Krone Exchange Rate Appreciated?”  This box states:
“The Government and the Storting adopted the guideline for the use of petro-
leum revenues in March 2001.  The rule implies a gradual increase of the use
of petroleum revenues over the central government budget in the years ahead.
Higher demand for private and public services means that the sheltered sector
[the nontradable sector] will absorb a greater share of available labor re-
sources.  In an economy with full capacity utilization this can only occur
through a transfer of resources from the internationally exposed sector to the
sheltered sector.  This implies a real appreciation of the krone.” [Our empha-
sis.]
On the other hand, the box mentions a number of other potential factors affecting the
exchange rate, so this particular explanation does not get more weight than others.
Perhaps debaters should be somewhat excused if they do not grasp the significance of
this explanation?
                                                
23 There is also a more technical problem with the idea that the same inflation target in Norway and the
rest of Europe would imply a stable nominal exchange rate, even if the real exchange rate is stable or
even constant.  Inflation targeting is distinct from price-level targeting in the following way.  Suppose
the inflation target is exceeded one year, so inflation is higher and the price level rises more than the
inflation target.  In following years, under inflation targeting, this miss of the inflation target is not un-
done.  Instead, the inflation target applies from the new higher price level.  This will introduce a unit
root in the (log) price level.  In the simple case when inflation deviations from the inflation target is
white noise, the (log) price level will be a random walk with drift equal to the inflation target.  With a
constant real exchange rate, the nominal exchange rate will be proportional to the ratio of the domestic
price level and the foreign price level. That is, the log exchange rate will be equal to a constant plus the
difference between the log domestic price level and the log foreign price level.  If both log price levels
have a unit root, the log exchange rate will be nonstationary rather than stationary and stable.  In the
special case when both domestic and foreign inflation deviations from the inflation targets are white
noise and the domestic and foreign inflation targets are the same, the log exchange rate will be a ran-
dom walk.  If instead both Norway and the rest of Europe had a monetary-policy regime of price-level
targeting (with price-level targets rising at the same inflation target), the two price levels would be
trend-stationary with the same trend, and the log nominal exchange rate would be stationary.
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Several recent speeches of Bank officials discuss the impact of the guidelines for fis-
cal policy and the phasing in of oil revenues, but arguably they could be even clearer
on this point.  Furthermore, these speeches, in our view, do not sufficiently emphasize
that the real appreciation of the currency is a real and not a monetary phenomenon,
and that it is not due to monetary policy.  Also, the Bank does not seem to use the
concept of the neutral real interest rate, nor even explicitly the output gap, in its ex-
planations of monetary policy, and as noted in section 5, they might add to the Bank’s
analysis and explanation.  A graph of the output gap and the forecast of the future
output gap appeared in the Inflation Report of December 2000, chart 3.11 shows a
graph of the output gap and even a forecast of it.  We have not seen any references to
the output gap in later Inflation Reports.  The main message from the Bank on the is-
sue of currency appreciation seems to be that inflation targeting implies that currency
movements will increase and be more similar to the variability experienced in other
countries with inflation targeting.  Moreover, occasionally it has been communicated
that a commitment to the inflation target will over time be the best guard against ex-
change-rate fluctuations, which we consider somewhat misleading, at least for an oil-
producing economy with increasingly expansionary fiscal policy.
6.2  Potential contributions by Norges Bank to the debate on currency ap-
preciation
· The Bank should more clearly explain the limits of monetary policy in relation to
the real adjustment of the Norwegian economy that is likely to take place due to
the new guidelines of fiscal policy and, in particular, explain that monetary policy
cannot be expected to prevent the associated real appreciation of the krone.
7  Research at Norges Bank
The research at Norges Bank is mostly done at the Research Department of Norges
Bank.  The Research Department was gradually built up during the 1980s and 1990s.
It is now playing a leading role in Norwegian macroeconomic research.  The depart-
ment is also very strong in time-series econometrics and the economics of banking.
From the start the department has encouraged international publishing and network-
ing.  Its reprint series goes back to 1988.  It demonstrates that the department has
quite a decent publication record.  Below we discuss the Bank’s RIMINI model and
the challenges for research at Norges Bank.
7.1  The RIMINI model
Since the 1980s, the development, revision and maintenance of a quarterly dynamic
macroeconometric model of the Norwegian economy have been important tasks of the
Research Department.  The RIMINI model (Real economy and Income accounts – a
MINI model) has been developed over a number of years.  It now comprises 375
equations, 74 of which are estimated behavioral relationships.  The estimation periods
go back to 1968.  The underlying modeling strategy is ambitious, putting strong em-
phasis on developing econometrically well-specified dynamic equations with error-
correction mechanisms and parameter invariance both with respect to new observa-
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tions and shifts in exogenous variables.  The model builders give high priority to good
forecasting and simulation properties.  Each equation is normally modeled separately
from the rest and then combined into a complete system.  The model is backward-
looking rather than forward-looking, in the sense that there are no forward variables
or expectations variables in the model.
The RIMINI model serves several purposes for the Bank.  The most important pur-
pose is forecasting 2-5 years ahead to make projections for the Inflation Report.  It has
also been used for econometric monetary-policy evaluation and for analyses of finan-
cial stability and fragility.  Often, the model is used in conjunction with smaller mod-
els to address special issues, such as models for several components of CPI.  Discre-
tionary judgmental adjustments like add factors (intercept corrections) are often used
to adjust the model forecasts.  Therefore, the projections published in the Inflation
Reports express an overall assessment of the results from different models with con-
siderable judgment.
The model allows simulations with exogenous interest rates and exchange rates.  The
standard assumptions for Norges Bank’s projections are constant interest rates and
exchange rates, but the model can also accommodate an exchange rate in line with
uncovered interest-rate parity.
For outsiders, it is difficult or even impossible to make a detailed evaluation of the
properties of the model, since the documentation of the entire model has not yet been
published.  Moreover, the model is constantly being revised and further developed.
RIMINI is an example of the approach to fitting reduced-form models that is some-
times called the LSE approach and is associated with the work of David Hendry.  This
is from a methodological point of view a rather controversial approach to model
building (see, for instance, Faust and Whiteman (1997a,b) and Hendry (1997)).  Fur-
thermore, an inflation-targeting central bank needs to make projections conditional on
alternative instrument-rate settings, for instance, instrument-rate paths.  Doing this in
a reduced-form model is associated with inherent problems, especially whether the
reduced-form model is invariant to the alternative instrument-rate paths.  A largely
empirical model is also obviously very sensitive to the problem of being estimated on
data from a different monetary-policy regime, in Norwegian case from periods of ex-
change-rate targeting and interest-rate regulation.
Norges Bank is somewhat unusual among central banks in putting such emphasis on
this particular model-building approach. 24  Other central banks have instead put strong
emphasis on structural models, for instance, the FRB/US model developed at the Fed-
eral Reserve Board or the variants of the Quarterly Projection Model developed at
Bank of Canada and further developed and used by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
and the Riksbank.  These structural models are somewhat eclectic applications of
modern open-economy macroeconomics where the equations have structural inter-
pretations and therefore may be more invariant to policy changes.  This means that the
models can accommodate both backward- and forward-looking variables, and hence
                                                
24 The Reserve Bank of Australia also has a model inspired by this approach, see Beechey, Bharucha,
Cagliarini, Gruen and Thompson (2002).  The RBA model is more compact, with only five estimated
equations against RIMINI’s 74, and better documented.
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include forward-looking expectations formations and asset prices.  The models can
also work as a theoretical framework during policy discussions and thereby contribute
to more coherent and disciplined arguments.
The major investment into building RIMINI was made before inflation targeting was
introduced in Norway.  RIMINI may very well be an efficient empirical model for
unconditional forecasting (forecasting not conditional on particular instrument-rate
paths, for instance), but the committee has severe doubts about whether RIMINI is the
most appropriate model given the new demands for conditional projections and
simulations that arise under inflation targeting.  We believe Bank of Norway should
invest resources into building structural models that at least can be used parallel with
RIMINI.  A suite of not-too-large models for different purposes may very well be
most appropriate.  The committee is inherently skeptical towards all-purpose models.
They tend to grow larger and more complex over time, as the different purposes call
for more details in different directions.  Maintaining, re-estimating and developing
complex all-purpose models are quite costly, commits the staff to do a high proportion
of routine work, and may prevent other more constructive activities in a central bank’s
research department.25
Norges Bank using similar models as other inflation-targeting central banks will also
make information exchange, model discussions and research cooperation with other
such banks easier.  The fact that RIMINI is not a transparent and clear-cut structural
model that could easily be compared to models used by other central banks may re-
duce the effectiveness of sharing empirical results and model experience with other
central banks.
7.2  Challenges for research at Norges Bank
The new framework of inflation targeting will continue to provide challenges for re-
search at Norges Bank.  Given the academic strength of the Bank and its research tra-
ditions, we are confident that it will be able to meet this cha llenge.
We have already suggested that the dominance of RIMINI should be reduced and that
new more structural models should be developed.  Norges Bank will also need more
general theoretical and empirical research on issues related to monetary policy in gen-
eral and inflation targeting in particular.  Individual researchers at the Bank have al-
ready demonstrated high competence in these areas and made important contributions
to such research.  Active research in these areas is of considerable importance to the
Bank.  The Bank must have its own competence and capacity for such research for
several reasons:  Such competence and capacity is necessary in order to rightly assess
                                                
25 One potential problem with RIMINI is that the effects of interest-rate changes on output, employ-
ment and inflation in many cases are surprisingly small and with surprisingly long lags (see for in-
stance a box in the Inflation Report 4/2000, of December 2000).  There are a number of reason why
this is the case, namely estimation on data from other policy regimes, inadequate modeling of expecta-
tions formation or the interplay between the interest-rate and exchange-rate channels, etc.  It may also
be that the results of RIMINI are adequate.  We have not had the time and resources to look into this
issue. We understand, though, that when RIMINI is used, the model structure is frequently adjusted ad
hoc such as to permit quicker effects of interest rate changes on employment and output.  This is hardly
a satisfactory solution.
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the quality and practicality of research related to monetary policy and inflation tar-
geting conducted at other central banks and academic institutions, which is a prereq-
uisite for taking advantage of and applying such research to Norwegian problems and
issues of concern for Norges Bank.  Furthermore, such competence and capacity is
necessary to do research specifically directed to specific Norwegian problems and is-
sues of concern for Norges Bank that therefore may not be done elsewhere.  Finally,
such competence and capacity at the Bank will allow the Bank to contribute to the
world-wide development of monetary policy and inflation targeting.
An even stronger commitment by the Bank to maintain and improve such competence
and capacity may be necessary for Norges Bank to maintain the status of a best-
international-practice inflation targeter that we think it currently deserves.  Competi-
tion is stiff at the top, and the other top inflation targets are hard at work at new re-
search.  The Research Department at the Riksbank has as a norm for productivity that
each researcher shall produce on average 1-2 working papers per year and that almost
all of these shall be published in international scientific journals.  It is desirable that a
high proportion of the working papers produced are of such quality that they are ac-
cepted for publication in international scientific journals.
7.3  Potential improvements to research at Norges Bank
Potential improvements to research at Norges Bank includes
· Less emphasis on the Bank’s large reduced-form model RIMINI and more em-
phasis on the development of alternative structural models.
· An even stronger commitment to research at an academic level on issues related to
monetary policy in general and inflation targeting in particular.
· A high proportion of the working papers should be of such quality that they are
accepted for publication in international scientific journals.
8  Conclusions and list of potential improvements
With regard to the institutional framework for monetary policy in Norway, we find
that it has considerable weakness.  There is no legislated mandate for price stability.
Although Norges Bank in practice has considerable operational independence, this
independence is insufficiently safeguarded in the central-bank act.  There is no ex-
plicit accountability structure according to which Norges Bank can be held account-
able for its policy.  With regard to the institutional framework, we recommend the
following improvements:
· A full-fledged institutional reform should be undertaken, similar to those that have
been accomplished in the U.K. or Sweden.  The reform should specify a mandate
for price stability, operational independence, and accountability for Norges Bank.
Within the existing legislative framework, there are, however, several potential im-
provements of the framework that we recommend:
· In order to resolve the inherent inconsistency between exchange-rate stability and
low and stable inflation for Norway, the references to exchange-rate stability in
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the monetary-policy guidelines should be deleted.  (More precisely, the first sen-
tence should be deleted and the second sentence moved to after the fifth sentence.)
· The appointments to the Executive Board should be of experts on monetary policy
and related areas, for instance, macroeconomics and financial markets, so that
members can independently contribute to the achievement of the announced ob-
jectives for monetary policy.
· The custom to invite political parties to nominate members to the Executive Board
should be discontinued, in order to avoid the risk of sectoral, political or special-
interest representation and related risks of deadlocks or policy directed to special
interests rather than the country as a whole.
· Nonattributed minutes and attributed voting records from the Executive Board
should be published, in order to strengthen the accountability and further improve
transparency.  These minutes should note without attribution to individual mem-
bers which issues were discussed and what arguments were presented, as well as
how individual members have voted.
· The essential material on monetary policy submitted to or formulated by the Ex-
ecutive Board, for instance, the Strateginotat (Notes on Strategy) outlining policy
for the next four months should be published, in order to strengthen accountability
and further improve transparency.
· Several additional improvements to strengthen the accountability of Norges Bank
should be undertaken:  (1) An evaluation by the Ministry of Finance of how Nor-
ges Bank has conducted monetary policy and achieved the stated objectives for
monetary policy should be included in the Kredittmelding (the report by the Min-
istry of Finance to the Storting).  (2) Regular hearings on monetary policy should
be held in the Storting with the governor and other officials of Norges Bank, with
the assistance of experts appointed by the Storting.  (3) An annual or biannual
conference on monetary policy in Norway should be held, financed by Norges
Bank but organized independently, for instance, by an academic institution, and
open to the general public and media.  At such a conference, papers evaluating
monetary policy by the Bank could be presented by national and international ex-
perts followed by comments by Bank officials and public discussion.
Overall, we believe Norges Bank is conducting monetary policy in line with the best
international practice demonstrated by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of
England and Sveriges Riksbank.  Nevertheless, we would like to recommend a num-
ber of improvements to the conduct of monetary policy, which if undertaken would in
several cases push the frontier of best-international-practice inflation targeting further
out:
· Inflation projections should generally be done conditional on the Bank’s preferred
instrument-rate path (Norges Bank’s instrument rate is its overnight deposit rate);
that is, conditional on its best forecast of its future instrument-rate settings.  This
would normally be a time-varying instrument-rate path.  The assumed exchange-
rate path should also normally be the Bank’s best forecast of the future exchange
rate, also normally a time-variable path.  This would avoid some problems and in-
consistencies associated with the current standard assumption of constant interest
and exchange rates.  It may also make monetary policy more predictable and im-
prove the Bank’s communication with the market.
· The central projections should be the mean projections (the probability-weighted
average outcome) rather than mode projections (the most likely outcome).  This is
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in line with established economic theory, which says that it is the mean forecast
rather than the mode forecast that is relevant for decisions.  This would normally
make the somewhat cumbersome adjustment of the mode projection to the balance
of risk unnecessary, and the fan charts for the projections would mainly be used to
illustrate the uncertainty of the projections.
· The Bank should construct and publish projections of potential output, actual out-
put and hence the output gap, conditional on time-variable instrument-rate paths.
In this way the Bank can better reach the most desirable compromise between in-
flation variability and output-gap variability and the resulting compromise will be
more open to external scrutiny.
· The emphasis on the precise two-year horizon of inflation projections on target
should be reduced.  Instead, the Bank should find the projections of inflation, the
output gap and the corresponding instrument-rate path that the Bank thinks would
achieve the best compromise between inflation stability and output-gap stability.
These projections should be published in the Inflation Report and the Bank should
set its instrument rate accordingly.  These projections will then be the Bank’s best
unconditional forecast of future inflation, output gap and instrument rate. Pub-
lishing them will maximize the impact on private-sector expectations and thereby
implement monetary policy more effectively.  Publishing them also opens the
Bank’s projections for more precise external scrutiny.  The fan charts around the
projections should be constructed and interpreted as the Bank’s best unconditional
estimate of the uncertainty in the projections, thus conditional on its own future
policy response.
· The Bank’s analysis and explanations might benefit from further use of the con-
cepts of potential output, output gap and neutral real interest rate.
· The Bank could be more explicit about the weight it puts on output-gap stability
relative to inflation stability.
Regarding the debate about the current situation with the new guidelines for fiscal
policy and the corresponding real appreciation of the krone, arguably the Bank could
explain the current situation with even more clarity.  Thus, we recommend:
· The Bank should more clearly explain the limits of monetary policy in relation to
the real adjustment of the Norwegian economy that is likely to take place due to
the new guidelines of fiscal policy and, in particular, explain that monetary policy
cannot be expected to prevent the associated real appreciation of the krone.
Regarding the research at Norges Bank, we recommend:
· Less emphasis on the Bank’s large reduced-form model RIMINI and more em-
phasis on the development of alternative structural models.
· An even stronger commitment to research at an academic level on issues related to
monetary policy in general and inflation targeting in particular.
· A high proportion of the working papers should be of such quality that they are
accepted for publication in international scientific journals.
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Appendix:  Regulation on monetary policy, March 29, 2001
Established by Royal Decree of 29 March 2001 pursuant to Section 2, third para-
graph, and Section 4, second paragraph, of the Act of 24 May 1985 no 28 on Norges
Bank and the Monetary System
I
§ 1.
Monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone’s national and in-
ternational value, contributing to stable expectations concerning exchange rate deve l-
opments.  At the same time, monetary policy shall underpin fiscal policy by contrib-
uting to stable developments in output and employment.
Norges Bank is responsible for the implementation of monetary policy.
Norges Bank’s implementation of monetary policy shall, in accordance with the first
paragraph, be oriented towards low and stable inflation.  The operational target of
monetary policy shall be annual consumer price inflation of approximately 2.5 per
cent over time.
In general, the direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in interest
rates, taxes, excise duties and extraordinary temporary disturbances shall not be taken
into account.
§ 2.
Norges Bank shall regularly publish the assessments that form the basis for the im-
plementation of monetary policy.
§ 3.
The international value of the Norwegian krone is determined by the exchange rates
in the foreign exchange market.
§ 4.
On behalf of the State, Norges Bank communicates the information concerning the
exchange rate system ensuing from its participation in the International Monetary
Fund, cf. Section 25, first paragraph, of the Act on Norges Bank and the Monetary
System.
II
This regulation comes into force immediately.  Regulation no. 0331 of 6 May 1994 on
the exchange rate system for the Norwegian krone is repealed from the same date.
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